Taiwan Domestic Politics - Political Corruption, Cross Strait Relations, and National Identity by Hunter, Jason
TAIWAN DOMESTIC POLITICS
– POLITICAL CORRUPTION, CROSS STRAIT
RELATIONS, AND NATIONAL IDENTITY
By
JASON HUNTER
Masters of Science in International Studies
Oklahoma State University School of International
Studies
Stillwater, Oklahoma
2007
Submitted to the Faculty of the
Graduate College of the
Oklahoma State University
in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for
the Degree of
MASTER OF SCIENCE
May, 2007
ii
TAIWAN DOMESTIC POLITICS
– POLITICAL CORRUPTION, CROSS STRAIT
RELATIONS, AND NATIONAL IDENTITY
Thesis Approved:
Yonglin Jiang
Thesis Adviser
Joel Jenswold
Guoping Zhao
A. Gordon Emslie
Dean of the Graduate College
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter Page
I. BACKGROUND AND METHODOLOGY INTO RESEARCHING TAIWAN
DOMESTIC POLITICS...........................................................................................1
Introduction..............................................................................................................1
Methodology and Scope ..........................................................................................3
Origins on Taiwan’s Identity ...................................................................................5
Taiwan under Kuomingtang ..............................................................................6
II. ABIAN AS PRESIDENT AND GOVERNMENTAL REFORM ........................11
Issues Regarding the 2004 Presidential Election ...................................................16
Referendum......................................................................................................17
President is Shot...............................................................................................20
2004 Election Results ......................................................................................21
Political Scandals around the President ...........................................................22
Government Reforms.............................................................................................24
III. POLITICAL CORRUPTION – A CONTROVERSY OVER BLACK GOLD ....27
The Indictment .......................................................................................................28
The KMT Black-Gold Exclusion Clause...............................................................31
The Future Path and Identity Formation................................................................35
iv
IV. PUBLIC POLLS AND IDENTITY CHANGE...................................................38
New and Old Identities on Taiwan ........................................................................38
The Meaning of Chinese........................................................................................41
Government Initiated Name Alterations................................................................42
China’s Reaction....................................................................................................49
Analysis..................................................................................................................55
V. CONCLUSION......................................................................................................58
Governmental Reforms..........................................................................................59
Chen’s Years as President......................................................................................59
Ma Ying-jeou’s Political Scandal ..........................................................................61
Identity Formation on Taiwan ...............................................................................61
Final Remarks ........................................................................................................63
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................67
APPENDIX A..............................................................................................................70
APPENDIX B ..............................................................................................................73
APPENDIX C ..............................................................................................................76
vLIST OF TABLES
1. Regimes of Taiwan and China………………………………………………………...6
2. 2004 Legislative Yuan Election Results…………………………………………......15
3. 2001 Legislative Yuan Election Results……………………………………………..15
4. 1998 Legislative Yuan Election Results……………………………………………..15
5. Changes in the Taiwanese/Chinese Identity as Tracked in surveys……………..…..65
6. Changes in the Unification – Independence Stances of Taiwanese as Tracked in
Surveys………………………………………………………………………………66
vi
LIST OF FIGURES
1. Republic of China Adds “Taiwan” to Cover of Passport......……..……..…………..43
2. Chunghwa Post Becomes Taiwan Post………………………………………………44
3. 2:28 Stamp Bears the Name “Taiwan”……………..………………………………..45
4. China Petroleum Company Changes Name to CPC, Taiwan………………………..46
5. License Plate Name Change………..………………………………………………..47
1CHAPTER I
BACKGROUND AND METHODOLOGY INTO RESEARCHING TAIWAN’S
DOMESTIC POLITICS
Introduction
The social, political, and international identity of Taiwan, officially named as the
Republic of China (ROC), has been a long disputed and controversial topic in which
scholars, academia, and government officials have debated for the past six decades. 1
Mainland China, People’s Republic of China (PRC) claims sovereignty over Taiwan
claiming that there is only one China and Taiwan is part of that China. In 1972, the
Shanghai Communiqué was issued. The document stated Beijing’s “One-China Policy”;
in which there is only one China and Taiwan is a fundamental part of that China. In order
to normalize relations with PRC, countries are required to acknowledge this policy. As a
result, Taiwan has lost international recognition over the years. Despite Taiwan’s loss of
international recognition in the 1970s, since 1949 when Chiang Kai-shek established his
government in Taiwan, the Republic of China has always functioned as a state politically
and structurally separate from the PRC.
The Republic of China, when originally established in Taiwan, was an
authoritarian foreign regime from the mainland China. Mainlanders who were former
military officials in Chiang’s army assumed high level government positions. Martial law
1 The Republic of China (ROC) refers to the political regime that has been in control of Taiwan from 1945
to present. Taiwan refers to the geographical location, the island and its surrounding territories, that are
currently under dispute between the ROC and People’s Republic of China.
2was enacted from 1947 to 1987. In the 1980s, Taiwan began to undergo reform.
Mainland officials were gradually replaced with native Taiwanese. Martial law was
repealed in 1987 and restrictions on media, speech, and assembly were lifted. Multiple
political parties became legally allowed to exist and national level political positions
began to be popularly elected by the people. Taiwan has become a democratized nation,
mainly, to establish the legitimacy of the Taiwan’s government among its people and to
establish legitimacy in the eyes of the international community.
Despite this fact, the future of Taiwan and its democracy is uncertain. Currently
the status quo; neither unification with China, nor declaration of de jure independence is
the policy accepted by most. However, this policy is not indefinitely sustainable. In
recent years, China has shown patience through seeking economic incentives to entice the
ROC, but it is not known how long China’s patience will last. Washington’s policy of
“no forced unification” could be challenged should China choose to use force. The
United States would be forced to decide between preserving a democracy, a core
principle of the United States, or maintaining international stability across the Pacific.
With no foreseen solution in the near future, the Taiwan issue remains a sensitive issue in
cross-strait, pacific, and international affairs.
In order to gain a better understanding of current cross-strait relations, this thesis
will examine domestic politics in Taiwan. Through better understanding the political
parties, the political process, and peoples’ perception of politics/national identity in
Taiwan this author hopes to contribute to the ongoing research regarding Taiwan’s
identity, its political recognition/or lack thereof, and predict or, at least, highlight key
variables that may influence the future of Taiwan and cross-strait relations. Some of the
3questions that will be addressed in this thesis are: What is the current state of political
affairs within Taiwan? What are the key factors and who are the key players that will
impact the direction of cross-strait relations within the next five years? As an academic,
political analyst, or government policy maker, what should be of most concern? Since
Chen Shui-bian’s election as Republic of China President in 2000, how have party
politics and the functioning of government evolved? What trends can we expect to see in
the upcoming Legislative Yuan elections in December and the Republic of China
Presidential election in March 2008? Through examination of recent political
developments within the ROC from 2000 to early 2007 the author hopes to better gage
where Taiwan will go in 2008 and the following years to come. It is impossible to predict
with any real degree of accuracy the future of politics on Taiwan and the direction of the
ROC democracy because of grave complexities within the international political
atmosphere. Through careful examination, this thesis seeks to bring contributive research
to the current state of the Republic of China on Taiwan, its people and political
foundation. This thesis will pay particular attention to shifting identities on Taiwan and
how social and political factors have played significant factors in these changes.
Methodology and Scope
Sources for this thesis were mainly derived from written literature materials using
government documents, academic journals, newspapers, and other primary and secondary
resources. The nature of this paper is to examine the current political developments in
Taiwan. In order to do this accurately, obtaining and examining recent literature is critical.
Other historical background of Taiwan ranging from 1662 to 2000 is also necessary to
understand Taiwan’s social and political development. For Taiwan’s current
4administration, the periods from 1945 to 1996 marked an important transition period for
Taiwan’s political development. Many authors have already heavily researched this area
and the purpose of the study is not to give an overall historical background of Taiwan’s
political development, but rather to give a snapshot of political developments in Taiwan
from 2000 to 2007. Other information that does not cover these dates may be included
but only in brief detail where necessary. As information becomes more current, more
emphasis will be placed on the information.
In addition to significant books the author looked for relevant academic articles in
sixteen major Asian oriented journals in recent years. The author wanted to include
human subjects to determine people’s attitudes toward politics and national identity.
However, due to time restraints and the complex nature of gathering accurate reliable
surveys results in Taiwan, the author believes such research would be a good opportunity
for a Ph.D. dissertation where people’s attitudes could be examined over a longer period
of time. This study will predominately rely on literature to draw its arguments and
conclusion.
This author believes that, in general, people make choices based on rational
thought. People look for solutions that benefit not only themselves but also those around
them. Although there are positive-sum and negative-sum gain situations throughout the
world, the author believes that there is more opportunity for positive-sum gain. Although
a situation may not be seen as positive-sum gain, two parties or more may in fact reap
benefits. In this paper, the author will demonstrate how Taiwan and China each have the
potential to benefit from cross-strait relations regardless of any change in the status quo.
This is not to say whether Taiwan or China should act unilaterally to change the status
5quo; doing so might create an international disaster. Rather, it is to say that a gradual
change in status quo in either direction could mutually benefit both Taiwan and China
over the long-term. Rational decisions will also ensure the security and stability of a
nation over time. This thought process will be used throughout the duration of this paper.
Origins on Taiwan’s Identity
The inhabitants of Taiwan before 1624 were predominately made up of
aboriginals, although today they only make up about 2.06% of Taiwan’s population. 2
The aboriginals of Taiwan are often referred to Austronesian or also known as Malayo-
Polynesian where the people and the language family group originate from Southeast
Asia. In 1624, the Dutch came to set up their trade post and became the administrators of
the island. 3 The Dutch wanted the aboriginals to produce crops in mass quantity for sale;
however, aboriginals traditionally would only grow what they needed and not grow
anymore. The Dutch soon encouraged immigration of farmers from south China to
produce cash crops. It was from this period that non-aboriginals, mostly Han Chinese
began to immigrate to China. 4
2 According to 2006 National Statistics, the population of Taiwan was 22.8 million. In the same year the
Taiwan aboriginal population was estimated at 471,000 people. Sources are from, National Statistics,
R.O.C.(Taiwan). The Republic of China Population by 5 Year Age Group Statistics [posting on-line]
(Taipei City, Taiwan: Ministry of the Interior, 2006, accessed 17 09 2006); available from
http://sowf.moi.gov.tw/stat/month/m1-06.xls; Internet. And National Statistics, R.O.C.(Taiwan). The
Republic of China Aborigines Population Statistics [posting on-line] (Taipei City, Taiwan: Ministry of the
Interior, 2006, accessed 17 09 2006); available from http://sowf.moi.gov.tw/stat/month/m1-06.xls; Internet.
3 For discussion on the identity of Taiwanese and historical development of Taiwanese aboriginals see,
Mellissa J. Brown, Is Taiwan Chinese? the impact of culture, power, and migration on changing identities
(Berkeley and Los Angeles, California: University of California Press, 2004).
4 For listing of regimes in Taiwan see table 1.
6Table 1.
Regimes of Taiwan and China
Regimes in Taiwan Regimes in China
Dutch 1624-1661 Ming 1368-1644
Zheng* 1661-1683 Qing 1644-1911
Qing 1683-1895 Republican 1911-1949
Japanese 1895-1945 Communist 1949-Present
Nationalist 1945-Present
*Zheng Chenggong was Ming loyalist and fled from the mainland to Taiwan.
In 1661, Zheng Cheng-gong invaded Taiwan. When Zheng came to Taiwan the
ethnic distribution changed dramatically since he brought with him 30,000 people mostly
of Han Chinese. 5 The Ming Dynasty was replaced by the Qing Dynasty in 1644. In July
1683, Admiral Shi Lang, former Zheng admiral who became a Qing admiral led 300
warships to capture the island. In September 1683 the people on the island surrendered
peacefully.6 At the end of the Sino-Japanese War in 1895, Taiwan was ceded to Japan in
the Treaty of Shimonoseki.7 Taiwan was under Japanese rule for 50 years until 1945
when Japan was defeated in World War II. 8 Taiwan was then returned to China, which
was under the administration of the Republic of China or Nationalist government at that
time.
Taiwan under Kuomintang
In 1945, the Republic of China took control over Taiwan. On February 28, 1947
an incident occurred with a cigarette vendor who was accused of selling untaxed
cigarettes. The agents began to confiscate her money and goods and the woman screamed
in protest. The woman was struck down and a large crowd gathered in her support. This
5 Mellissa J. Brown, Is Taiwan Chinese? the impact of culture, power, and migration on changing identities
(Berkeley and Los Angeles, California: University of California Press, 2004), 40-42.
6 Mellissa J. Brown, Is Taiwan Chinese? the impact of culture, power, and migration on changing identities
(Berkeley and Los Angeles, California: University of California Press, 2004), 42-43.
7 Mellissa J. Brown, Is Taiwan Chinese? the impact of culture, power, and migration on changing identities
(Berkeley and Los Angeles, California: University of California Press, 2004), 53-56.
8 For discussion on Taiwan identity formation and development of Taiwan during the Japanese colonial
period see, Leo T.S. Ching, Becoming “Japanese” (Berkeley and Los Angeles, California: University of
California Press, 2001).
7incident led into a petition against the government. This incident is known as the
February 28th Incident or 2:28 Incident and led to an escalation of events in which
thousands were murdered. The event symbolizes the oppression of Taiwanese people by
an authoritative regime.
However, the conflict continued to escalate and in March 1947 Chiang Kai-shek
sent troops to Taiwan to stabilize the situation. In that month, Taiwan scholars estimate
that 10,000 people were slaughtered. If this number includes the businessmen, scholars,
and political advocates who were seized and done away with then the death toll would be
estimated around 20,000. 9 As Cheng-yi Lin points out, “White terror” as it is often
referred to was used by the KMT to “suppress the Taiwanese democracy and
independence movement and to control the society” 10 Lin also adds that:
Taiwanese were politically socialized to support Taiwan’s eventual unification with
China….Through politically screened teachers and the deliberate design of the school curriculum,
the ROC government promoted China as the motherland as well as a Chinese national identity
among Taiwanese. 11
From 1949 until 1987 Taiwan was under martial law. Shelley Rigger notes that, “martial
law” not only gave the government broad powers to arrest and imprison dissenters, but
also imposed a complete ban on the formation of new political parties, effectively
enshrining the KMT regime as a one-party state.12 Rigger also indicates that the
government had control over mass media. Through political propaganda, the identity of
being Chinese was reinforced in Taiwan by the Republic of China administration.
9 George H. Kerr, Formosa Betrayed (London, Great Britain: John Dickens & Co Ltd, 1966; reprint,
Upland, CA: Taiwan Publishing Co., 2005), 256-310 (page citations are to the reprint edition).
10 Cheng-yi Lin and Wen-cheng Lin, "Democracy, Divided National Identity, and Taiwan’s National
Security," Taiwan Journal of Democracy 1, no. 2 (December 2005): 71-72.
11 Ibid. 72.
12 Shelley Rigger, Politics in Taiwan (New York, New York: Routledge, 1999), 22.
8In 1949, Chiang Kai-shek’s forces were defeated by the Chinese Communist
Party and he and the remnants of the republican government fled to Taiwan. When
Chiang Kai-shek arrived he established his government and planned for an attack to take
back the mainland. This, however, never materialized. Up until the mid to late 80s,
Taiwan’s policy regarding the mainland remained unchanged. Sheng Lijun illustrates the
ROC administration policy as follows.
Taiwan, under both Chiang Kai-chek and Chiang Ching-kuo, held a constant position that Taiwan
was as much Chinese territory as mainland China and that there was only one China and that
China was the R.O.C. not the P.R.C. this position began to change after Lee took office. In the late
1980s, Lee Teng-hui still proclaimed: “One China is the supreme principle”. On 23 February 1988,
he still insisted on a “one China policy, not a two Chinas policy”. But in 1990, Lee raised the
notion of “one China, two governments”. His own words were “One country, two governments.
This is a fact.” 13
In 1971 the Republic of China was replaced by the People’s Republic of China in the
United Nations. On January 1, 1979 the United States switched diplomatic relations from
Taipei to Beijing. Afterwards other countries began to follow suit and Taiwan began to
lose its international recognition. 14 By the 1980s the KMT began to change its policy in
an effort to find legitimacy of the regimes own existence, internationally as well as
locally.
The KMT administration was originally made of mainlanders, former military
officials in Chiang Kai-shek’s army. The locals were mainly kept out of politics.
However, as the mainlander generation grew older the KMT needed new blood to fill its
ranks. Since the mainlander population only amounted to about 13% of the total island
population the KMT had to draw more support from the local Taiwanese people. 15
13 Sheng Lijun, China's Dilemma The Taiwan Issue (Pasir Panjang, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian
Studies, 2001), 99.
14 U.S. Department of State. Background Note: Taiwan [posting on-line]. Washington D.C., United States:
U.S. Department of State, 2005, accessed 25 09 2006. Available from
http:/www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35855.htm
15 The differences between mainlanders and domestic Taiwanese are discussed in chapter four.
9Steven E. Phillips adds that the KMT’s fight to maintain legitimacy helped democratize
the regime.
The regime’s attempt to co-opt some islanders by allowing them to participate in the state and
party enabled Taiwanese to take over the Kuomintang and the Republic of China from the inside.
Hard authoritarianism shifted to soft authoritarianism, as Chiang Ching-kuo, who succeeded his
father in 1975, realized that the old Cold War disciplines of one-party rule and limited political
participation for Taiwanese were no longer viable. Domestic political reform and Taiwanization
helped to bolster the regime’s legitimacy in the face of growing international isolation. 16
In 1986 the illegal Democratic Progressive Party was allowed to run in the National
Assembly and Legislative Yuan elections. It marked the first true two party contests in
Taiwan’s history. A year later, Chiang Ching-kuo, Chiang Kai-shek’s son, repealed
martial law. 17
During the 1990s Taiwan underwent some major changes to the constitution,
government, and political format. Steve Tsang stated that during the 1990s Taiwan
gradual evolution: “The Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan has undergone, mainly over
the last ten years, a process of transition from a developmental authoritarian dictatorship
to a representative democracy.”18 One of the first changes Tsang mentions was that, “In
May 1992, the new National Assembly passed a number of constitutional amendments,
including the decision to introduce popular elections for the positions of governor of
Taiwan and mayors of Taipei and Kaohsiung.” 19 Taiwan was then considered to become
a full democracy when Lee Tung-hui became Taiwan’s first directly elected president in
1996. 20
16 Steven E. Phillips, "Identity and Security in Taiwan," Journal of Democracy 17, no. 3 (July. 2006): 60.
17 Shelley Rigger, Politics in Taiwan (New York, New York: Routledge, 1999), 126-130.
18 Steve Tsang and Hung-mao Tien, ed. Democratization In Taiwan Implications for China (Aberdeen,
Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1999), 49.
19 Ibid., 54.
20 Ibid., 15.
10
Although the ROC on Taiwan has become a democracy its status in the
international community is in a constant debate. The ROC enjoys many freedoms and
privileges that come with statehood yet with China’s claims on the island; much of the
country’s international recognition is on the decline. Yun-han Chu states that, “Taiwan
already enjoys de facto independence from mainland China; its internal debate is limited
to the island’s de jure independence.” 21 If Taiwan were to declare de jure independence it
could cause an international conflict with China. Then again, if Taiwan were to reunify
with China at its present state it is very possible that the people of Taiwan would lose
many of their freedoms that they enjoy today. This thesis examines developments in
Taiwan’s domestic politics looking at political policy, constitutional change, government
attitudes, and people’s perception to gain a better idea of where the Taiwanese people see
themselves, today, in the midst of status quo and attempt to gauge the direction Taiwan
will head in the future. Chapter two discusses Chen Shui-bian’s Presidency and
governmental reform since 2000.
21 Yun-han Chu, "Taiwan’s Unique Challenges," The Journal of Democracy 7, no. 3 (July 1996): 18. 
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CHAPTER II
ABIAN AS PRESIDENT AND GOVERNMENTAL REFORM
When Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) became president of the Republic of China in
2000 it marked a major turning point in the island’s history. It was just as remarkable as
the1996 Republic of China election when Lee Tung-hui ( 李登輝 ) was elected president.
The 1996 election was the first popular election where the president was elected by the
people. It also marked the first time that native Taiwanese (non-mainlander) held the
most powerful position in the country.
1 Chen Shui-bian’s election to power marks a major trend occurring in Taiwan politics as
it is one variable in Taiwan’s shifting identity. Although Chen’s victory was by a
marginal percent it shows the willingness of the people to elect an official with a stance
more geared toward independence even in the face of China’s opposition. The increasing
success of the DPP in national and local elections shows that the support for Taiwanese
identity is growing in Taiwan; and new laws and constitutional amendments further
enable the people to have a more direct say on political policy and identity formation.
The significant factor in Chen Shui-bian being elected to power was that it
marked the end of the sixty-five year one party rule by Kuomintang and the first non-
KMT politician elected to presidency. This signified the ROC’s gradual evolution into a
full democracy. Also pointed out by T.Y. Wang was that it was significant because, “it
1 Shelley Rigger, Politics in Taiwan (New York, New York: Routledge, 1999), 174-177. See Also, Denny
Roy, Taiwan a political history (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2003), 183-226.
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was the first time that political power at the national level had been transferred peacefully
from one political party to another.” 2 At Chen Shui-bian’s Inauguration speech he said
the following:
I personally understand the significance of the alteration of political parties and of the peaceful
transition of power lies not in a change of personnel or political parties, nor is it a dynastic change.
Rather, it is the return of state and government power to the people through a democratic
procedure. The country belongs to the people, rather than to any individual or political party. The
government and its officials, from the head of state down to the ran-and-file employees, exist for
the service of the people. 3
Chen’s election to power was definitely a significant moment for democratic
development on Taiwan. However, for Chen it also marked the beginning challenges
ahead.
Although Chen Shui-bian won the presidency it was not by an overwhelming
majority. In the 2000 Presidential election there were three candidates: Chen Shui-bian
for the Democratic Progressive Party, Lien Chan (連戰) running for Kuomintang, and
James Soong (宋楚瑜) running as an independent. Had Song run on the KMT ticket
many predicted that Soong would have won the presidency. However, when he chose to
run as an independent it created a split in the pan blue voters. Some voters stayed with the
party and voted for Lien while others voted for Soong. This split in the vote resulted in
Chen coming out on top. The final results on March 18, 2000 showed that Chen had
received 39.3 percent of the vote. Soong came in second with a marginal 36.8 percent of
the vote. Lien faired worst of all with only 23 percent. 4 There was only a 2.5 percent
difference in votes between Chen and Soong. Comparatively, 59.8 of the voters voted for
a candidate that was not Chen. It just turned out that of the three, Chen had the best
2 T.Y. Wang, "Cross-strait relations after the 2000 election in Taiwan," Asian Survey 41, no. 5 (Sep-Oct
2001): 716.
3 T.Y Liu, Shih-chung. President Chen Shui-bian's Selected Addresses and Messages A New Era of Peace
and Prosperity. Taipei, Taiwan: Office of the President, 2001.
4 Denny Roy, Taiwan a political history (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2003), 230.
13
percentage. However, with only 39 percent of the vote and the runner-up only losing by
such a small margin, Chen’s victory, in essence, was only a small one. His job as
president definitely would not be easy as he would still have to prove himself to the
people that he could lead the country. In addition, his actions as president would be under
heavy scrutiny since the opposition party (pan-blue) was in the majority at the time of
Chen’s election to power. In 2000, the KMT held 115 of the 225 Legislative Yuan seats
maintaining a marginal but clear majority. 5
Chen’s first year as president was a difficult one. Chen’s power base was weak in
his first year. As mentioned earlier, he only has less than 40 percent of the vote. KMT’s
influence on other branches of government remained strong. The KMT also held the
majority in the Legislative Yuan which limited Chen’s ability to push initiatives through
the legislature. The DPP only held about a third of the seats. Chen’s administration was
also inexperienced; “Many of Chen’s advisers were young, idealistic, and lacking in
administrative experience. Only a third of Chen’s cabinet members were DPP members,
and few of them had been public servants higher than the local level.” 6 Chen also had
difficulty in fulfilling his campaign promises. Chen had promised a “3-3-3” program in
which, “NT three thousand dollars [US $91] per month to poor citizens over age sixty-
five, exemption from medical expenses for children under age three, and loans at an
interest rate of 3 percent for first-time home buyers.” 7 However, when Chen came into
office he was faced with an increasing deficit from increases in expenditures for social
services along with increased tax cuts over the past several years. In addition, the cost to
5 Yu-Shan Wu, "Taiwan in 2000: Managing the Aftershocks from Power Transfer," Asian Survey 41, no. 1
(February 2001): 45-46.
6 Denny Roy, Taiwan a political history (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2003), 231.
7 Ibid., 231.
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recover central Taiwan from the September 1999 earthquake proved arduous. Over two
thousand people were killed and over eight thousand five hundred people were injured in
the quake and more than 100,000 were without homes.8 Keeping Chen’s campaign
promises proved to be difficult.
Six months into Chen’s presidency, problems for Chen worsened. The pan-blue
made a motion to impeach the president. “The opposition tried to impeach him over the
issue of a nuclear power plant that had been approved by the government before Chen
became president. Chen cancelled the project.” 9 The impeachment was not successful
which further divided political camps in Taiwan.
Chen hoped that things would improve by the next election. Improve they did. As
illustrated in tables two through four, in the December 2001 Legislature Election the
KMT lost nearly 45% of their seats from 123 seats down to only 68 seats. 10 Two major
factors played a roll in KMT’s decline. First and most significant was James Soong’s (宋
楚瑜) decision to split away from the KMT party. When he did, he formed his own party
with similar principles to the KMT that he named the People’s First Party (PFP) (親民黨).
The People’s first party gained 46 seats that year. In addition to PFP, the politically
affiliated KMT former President of Taiwan founded his own political party, radically
different from the KMT named Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) (台灣團結聯盟). Taiwan
8 Lauren Chen, President Lee announces emergency decree [newspaper on-line] (Taipei, Taiwan: Taipei
Times, September 26, 1999, accessed 2 April 2007); available from
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/1999/09/26/4033; Internet. and Denny Roy, Taiwan a
political history (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2003), 231. See also Jean-Pierre Cabestan,
“Taiwan in 1999: A Difficult Year for the Island and the Kuomintang,” Asian Survey 40, no. 1 (Jan-Feb
2000)175-177.
9 Ibid. and Denny Roy, Taiwan a political history (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2003), 231.
10 Results of Recent Elections in the R.O.C. [statistics on-line] (Taipei, Taiwan: Election Study Center,
National Chengchi University, 2006, accessed 2 April 2007); available from
http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/eng/data/1993%7E2004eng.pdf; Internet.
15
Solidarity Union differed from the KMT because of its pro independence philosophy. In
fact, the TSU is skewed further towards independence than the DPP. Nevertheless, in the
2001 election TSU gained 13 seats which took away from the KMT total. The
Democratic Progressive Party was also successful that year gaining a total of 87 seats in
the legislature, nearly a 20% increase from the previous election. This made the DPP the
Table 2. Table 4.
2004 Legislative Yuan Election Results
Party Votes Seats %
Pan-blue 4,540,694 113 50.22
KMT 3,190,081 79 35.11
PFT 1,350,613 34 15.11
Pan-green 4,228,141 102 44.86
DPP 3,471,429 89 39.56
TSU 756,712 12 5.33
Other 948,524 11 4.88
Total 9,717,359 225 100.00
Table3.
largest political party in the legislature; however, even with TSU they did not make the
majority. The KMT along with PFP held the majority. Nevertheless, the 2001 election
was a great victory for the DPP.
During Chen’s presidency he proposed cutting the size of the Legislative Yuan in
order to enhance efficiency and to save money. Chen also proposed legislation that would
prohibit political parties from owning corporations and would force political parties to
1998 Legislative Yuan Election Results
Party Votes Seats %
Pan-blue 4,659,679 123 54.70
KMT 4,659,679 123 54.70
PFT/TSU* n/a n/a n/a
Pan-green 2.966.835 70 39.59
DPP 2,966,835 70 36.59
NP* 708,465 11 4.90
Other 1,700,850 21 9.30
Total 10,035,829 100.00
*PFT was not formed until 2000 and TSU was not
until 2001 so their election results are not included in
the 1998 election statistics.
*NP or New Party only had one seat and less than 1%
of the vote in later elections so NPs statistics were
included in the “other” section of preceding tables.
2001 Legislative Yuan Election Results
Party Votes Seats %
Pan-blue 4,967,207 114 50.66
KMT 2,949,371 68 30.22
PFT 1,917,836 46 20.44
Pan-green 4,249,300 100 44.45
DPP 3,447,740 87 38.67
TSU 801,560 13 5.78
Other 1,211,348 11 4.88
Total 9,116,507 225 100.00
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surrender funds obtained illegally. 11 Perhaps the most significant proposal for Chen’s
future was when Chen proposed to have a referendum on the future of Taiwan. This
referendum became a key political issue in the 2004 Presidential election.
Issues regarding the 2004 Presidential election
Unlike the 2000 Presidential Election there were only two candidates, Chen Shui-
bian for the DPP and once again Lien Chan for the KMT. This time, however, instead of
running against each other Lien and James Soong ran together on the same ticket. Soong
ran as Lien’s vice president in hopes of gaining KMT and PFP alliance (blue alliance) in
an effort to prevent a repeat of the 2000 election.
In the 2004 Election Chen changed his strategy from targeting the median voters
to rallying loyalist in the pan-green. Instead of targeting the moderate middle Chen chose
to conjure up support for Taiwanese nationalism. Cal Clark argues the reasoning for
Chen’s logic as follows:
Candidates with a significant lead are not likely to challenge the status quo for fear of alienating
current supporters. Conversely, those who are behind need to be aggressive and to “shake up the
pot” in the hope of changing the dynamics of the election. 12
According to a China Times, Polls on the March 2004 Presidential Election from
February 2003 to the end of November the Pan-blue had a lead over the pan-green by a
ten percent margin. 13
11 John F. Copper, "Taiwan: Consolidating its Democracy?," China: An International Journal 1, no. 2
(February 2003): 329-330.
12 Cal Clark, "The Paradox of the National Identity Issue in Chen Shui-bian’s 2004 Presidential Campaign:
Base Constituencies vs. the Moderate Middle," Issues & Studies 41, no. 1 (March 2005): 70.
13 Finding reliable survey results is very complicated when relating to Taiwan domestic politics. For
various reason such as political biases, small sample size, lack of representation of the population as a
whole can skew results. China Times is a little more skewed towards the Blue than the Green so possibly
the results reflect this. However, scholars do use these polls as a meter to gauge political development.
Perhaps the most reliable political surveys come from Election Study Center of National Chengchi
University. Chengchi University is know to be a KMT affiliated university, however, their surveys have
been recognized as being valid and reliable with little bias. China Times Polls was obtained from the
following source. Tun-jen Cheng and Da-chi Liao, "Testing the Immune System of a newly Born
17
Major issues for the 2004 election were national identity pro-unification versus
pro-independence and constitutional reform. The economy was also an issue. However,
“the DPP was able to inject national identity and statehood issues into the electoral
campaign and use them to displace the economy as the most salient issue.” 14 In the last
ten to twenty years, national identity has always been a key issue of Taiwan politics. 15
The idea of the referendum was to fulfill the promises of the government to hold
referendums on major issues such as “the construction of Taiwan’s 4th nuclear plant,
reforming the Legislature, and joining the [World Health Organization] WHO.” 16 In
order to bring about these changes the DPP proposed referendum legislation. The KMT
originally opposed arguing that such legislation would cause political chaos in Taiwan.
The people, however, never used this argument. 17 KMT sensed mainstream oppositions
and decided to pass its own version of a referendum law at the Taipei City Council. It
was much more restrictive other versions enacted by the Legislature. Once the
Legislature passed their referendum law the one produced for Taipei City was superseded.
18
Referendum
On November 27, 2003 the Referendum Law was passed and was put into law on
December 31st. The law was a compromise between the two blocks. Pan-blue was able
prevent voters to have any real direct influence on key issues such as national identity
Democracy: The 2004 Presidential Election in Taiwan," Taiwan Journal of Democracy 2, no. 1 (July
2006): 83-85.
14 Tun-jen Cheng and Da-chi Liao, "Testing the Immune System of a newly Born Democracy: The 2004
Presidential Election in Taiwan," Taiwan Journal of Democracy 2, no. 1 (July 2006): 84.
15 Cal Clark, "The Paradox of the National Identity Issue in Chen Shui-bian’s 2004 Presidential Campaign:
Base Constituencies vs. the Moderate Middle," Issues & Studies 41, no. 1 (March 2005): 61.
16 Michael Y.M., Kau, ed. Direct Democracy Practices in Taiwan The Taiwan Referendum Act, Reports,
and Analyses (Taipei, Taiwan: Taiwan Foundation for Democracy, 2005), 27.
17 Ibid., 27.
18 Ibid., 27-28.
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and major legislation bills. In order for the public to initiate a referendum they need at
least 770,000 signatures. In order for the bill to pass there needs to be a turn out of 50%
of the registered voters. 19
However the Referendum Law includes Article 17 from the DPP’s original draft
law, which allows the President to call a referendum on national defense issues where
national security is being threaten. Article 17 of the Referendum Law reads a follows.
When the nation is confronted by an external force that could be regarded as a threat of change of
the nation’s sovereignty, the president may, via a resolution of the Executive Yuan general
meeting, propose a matter crucial to national security to the citizens for a referendum.20
Chen’s ploy for the 2004 election was to use a referendum to have the people to vote on
issues regarding Taiwan’s status. After the Referendum Law was passed he used his
administrative power granted in Article 17 to hold a referendum. The referendum was
scheduled to be on the same day as the presidential election.
The referendum known as the “Peace Referendum” that was held on March 20,
2004 had two main issues. One issue was should Taiwan strengthen its national defense
and the other was should Taiwan engage in negotiations with China. The two issues were
worded as follows.
Issue 1: The People of Taiwan demand that the Taiwan Strait issue be resolved through peaceful
means. Should Mainland China refuse to withdraw the missiles it has targeted at Taiwan and to
openly renounce the use of force against us, would you agree that the Government should acquire
more advanced anti-missile weapons to strengthen Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities?
Issue 2: Would you agree that our Government should engage in negotiation with Mainland China
on the establishment of a “peace and stability” framework for cross-strait interactions in order to
build consensus and for the welfare of the peoples on both sides? 21
It was important for Chen and the DPP to hold the referendum on the same day as the
presidential election in order to get enough voter turnout. As stated earlier in order for the
19 Ibid., 28.
20 Ibid., 84-85.
21 Ibid., 2-3. 
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referendum to be valid it needs at least 50% of the total eligible voters to vote. In addition,
the referendum needs a simple majority for the referendum to pass.
The results of the Peace Referendum are as follows: On Issue 1, there were
6,511,216 votes in agreement and 581,413 votes in disagreement. On Issue 2, there were
6,319,663 votes in favor and 545,911 votes against the referendum. In looking at these
numbers alone there was a very high success rate with an 89% passage rate for Issue 1
and an 86% passage rate for Issue 2. The total eligible voting population was 16,497,746
people. Although very successful in the polls both issues failed to obtain the necessary
votes needed to pass. Both issues need a margin of 50% to pass. Issue 1 has 45.17% and
Issue 2 had 45.12$ of the total voters.
The positive and negative factor of the Referendum Law is that it is difficult to
make any changes to government policy, laws, and constitutional changes through public
involvement because it requires 50% of the total eligible voting population. If one were
to wish for the referendum to fail there are actually two options to defeat the referendum.
One option is to vote “no” on the referendum. The other option is not to vote at all. Either
way has the potential kill the bill. In the case of the peace referendum more green voters
chose to vote on the referendum than did blue voters according to the polls. However,
blue members and or those who disagreed with the initiative of the referendums also
chose to vote not in favor although their numbers were considerably less than favor votes.
In essence both blocks won. Pan-green was able to hold the referendum because of
Article 17 of the Referendum Law and the vote on both issues was in favor of the
referendum. On the other hand the KMT also won because they were able to make it
extremely difficult for average citizens to make any major changes in policy and
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legislation. As a result of the inclusion of Article 30, which stipulates the quorum
requirement, in the Referendum Law even though people voted in favor of both issues it
failed for failure of meeting the quorum requirement. 22
President Chen is Shot
Right before the presidential election on the afternoon of March 18th, President
Chen Shui-bian and Vice-President Annette Lu were shot while in a motorcade in
Tainan.23 President Chen was wounded on the right side of his stomach and Vice-
President Lu was wounded on her right knee. The president and the vice president were
not mortally wounded; however, the timing of the assassination attempt created quite a
controversy. The results on the Election Day showed that Chen had won and pan-blue
supports felt that it was a scam to conjure up more support. Tun-jen Cheng and Da-chi
Liao illustrate the controversy as follows.
The pan-Blue camp blamed a shooting incident on the eve of the election –the DPP candidate and
his running-mate, Annette Lu, were shot but not fatally wounded –for “reversing” the expected
outcome, and even contended that the election had been stolen at one point. The shooting
incidence has caused tremendous dissatisfaction and doubt within the pan-Blue camp. To pan-
Blue supporters, the shooting had occurred at too opportune a time, the scene of the shooting
seemed to have been compromised, and the activation of the “National Security Protocol” had
been used to unfairly prohibit too many military personnel – presumably more pan-Blue than pan-
Green in their partisan preference – from casting their votes. Hence many pan-Blue supporters,
from the moment that the shooting occurred, have not stopped seeking the “truth” about the
incident. 24
Consequently, the shooting of the President and Vice-President remains a mystery. No
suspects have been found, nor the weapon used, and as stated earlier the scene of the
crime had been compromised.
22 Ibid., 88.
23Chieh-yu Lin, President, vice president shot on campaign eve [newspaper on-line] (Taipei, Taiwan:
Taipei Times, March 19, 2004, accessed 16 March 2007); available from
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2004/03/19/2003107015; Internet.
24Tun-jen Cheng and Da-chi Liao, "Testing the Immune System of a newly Born Democracy: The 2004
Presidential Election in Taiwan," Taiwan Journal of Democracy 2, no. 1 (July 2006): 86.
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Even among academics opinions vary greatly. Cal Clark argues that “[the]
assassination attempt…almost certainly helped the pan-green ticket by generating a
sympathy vote.” 25 Other authors such as Tun-Jen Cheng say that the shooting may have
influenced the outcome but “whether it changed the direction of the vote is more difficult
to ascertain.” 26 In reality the shooting may have influenced the results of the election but,
if so, it is very difficult to determine to what degree if any that the incident changed the
direction of the votes. Also, accusations as to whether the shooting was a political scam
to gain more votes or whether it was an attack by pan-blue to eliminate the competition as
it were remains to be seen. Currently there is not enough information to determine who,
what, or the motivation of the attack. It appears to be a mystery that will not be solved
anytime in the near future.
2004 Election Results
In the 2000 election Chen had won by 2.5% of the vote. The 2004 election was
even closer with the margin of victory under 1%. “The gap between winner and loser was
only 0.22% of the valid vote. 27 The KMT demanded a recount as any political party
would, considering the closeness of the gap between the winner and loser. Before the
recount Chen had a margin of 30,000 votes. The final recount showed that he won by
around 25,000 votes. 28 Chen had successfully beaten Lien and Soong a team that most
people thought would be successful. Although the political polls were close Chen
prevailed in the end.
25Cal Clark, "The Paradox of the National Identity Issue in Chen Shui-bian’s 2004 Presidential Campaign:
Base Constituencies vs. the Moderate Middle," Issues & Studies 41, no. 1 (March 2005): 75.
26Tun-jen Cheng and Da-chi Liao, "Testing the Immune… Ibid 86.
27Laurence Whitehead, "Closely Fought Elections and the Institutionalization of Democracy," Taiwan
Journal of Democracy 2, no. 1 (July 2006): 7. 
28Kilbinder Dosajh and Duncan Innes-ker, ed. Country Profile Taiwan (Wanchai, Hong Kong: The
Economist Intelligence Unit Limited, 2006), 7.
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As for the 2004 Legislative Yuan Election the DPP was again able to maintain the
majority. As shown in tables two and three the DPP was able to gain two seats to have a
total of 89 seats. The KMT had a significant improvement of 11 seats increasing their
numbers to 79 seats gaining most of their seats from the PFP. Over all pan-green gained 2
seats to have a total of 102 seats while the pan-blue still maintained the majority,
however, loosing one seat and bringing their total to 113 seats. Secondary parties lost out
the most. The PFP lost 26% of their seats bringing their total to only 34 seats. The TSU
also lost one seat resulting in a total of 12 seats. The 2004 Legislative Yuan Election
further polarized political parties. This will prove for to be a heated battle for seats in the
legislature as the number of seats will be halved in the 2007 election.
Political scandals around the President
May 2006, perhaps, became the most difficult point of Chen Shui-bian’s career as
president. It was at this point that Chen would be placed under allegations of political
corruption. The Economist Intelligence Unit stated in November that “the president’s
approval ratings are now hovering around the lowest point since his election in 2000.” 29
On May 24, 2006 Chen Shui-bian’s son-in-law Chao Chien-ming ( 趙建銘 ) was
taken into custody for insider trading. Allegedly Chao had released insider information
regarding Taiwan Development Corporation stocks. 30 On December 28th Chen’s son-in-
law was sentenced to six years in prison for insider trading. 31
Chen had also come under pressure for regarding special presidential allowances.
Chen claimed that traditionally half of the allowance has been considered confidential.
29 Ibid, 14.
30
"Chao Chien-ming, father telling conflicting stories," China Post, 10 August 2006, accessed 18 February
2007. Available from Factiva.
31 Kilbinder Dosajh and Duncan Innes-ker, ed. Country Report Taiwan Wanchai, Hong Kong: The
Economist Intelligence Unit Limited (February 2006), 14.
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For these reason, receipts for government expenditures have not been shown to the public.
On November 8th, Chen replied to these accusations:
Mr. Chen responded to the allegations. He said that the funding system of the presidential office
needed reforming, as previous presidents had not conformed to official accounting and auditing
regulations either. The implication is that by providing false receipts to cover costs relating to
confidential activities, he was merely following a precedent. 32
Upon completion of the investigation the Ministry of Audit announced that the first lady
Wu Shu-chen was being indicted “over the misuse of public funds and for providing
fraudulent receipts. 33 According to the Taipei Times, “prosecutors had found that the
Presidential Office had spent NT$15 million of its special allowance expenditure
purchasing Sogo Department Store vouchers.” 34
From June to November there were three different attempts to impeach the
president over the political scandals and dissatisfaction over governmental performance.
In August 2006, the former DPP Chairman Shih Ming-teh sent Chen Shui-bian a letter
requesting him to resign. The letter stated, “For the sake of Taiwan and the DPP, I urge
Chen to step down bravely. Only a truly brave warrior admits his mistakes and gives up
what he holds dear.” 35 Shih urged the president to step down from his office and to stop
defending himself and his family. The people rallied in Taipei and in other cities in
Taiwan wearing red to draw support to impeach the president.
Government Reforms
32 Ibid., 7.
33 Ibid., 14.
34 Shih Hsiu-chuan and Rich Chang, "Chiu alleges Chen embezzled money from special fund," Taipei
Times, 1 August 2006, accessed 18 February 2007. Available from Factiva. and Yan-chih Mo, "Protest
turnout lower than expected; WET PARADE: Taipei police estimated that less than a third of the expected
number joined the rally, with pan-blue bigwigs like Ma and Soong appearing beside Shih," Taipei Times,
10 September 2006, accessed 16 March 2007. Available from Factiva.
35 Jewel Huang, "Presidential Office replies to Shih Ming-teh's letter; `OLD FRIENDS': Presidential Office
Secretary-General Mark Chen issued a guarded response to the former DPP leader's open letter demanding
that the president quit," Taipei Times, 10 August 2006, accessed 18 February 2007. Available from Factiva.
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From 2000 to 2007 there have been many reforms within the government
regarding law and the constitutional amendments. As stated earlier in the chapter, one
such change was the passage of the Referendum Law in 2003. The Referendum Law
enables the president to hold a referendum on a national security issues. Chen Shui-bian
took advantage of this law during the 2004 Presidential Election. The remainder of this
chapter will focus on amendments in the constitution of the People’s Republic of China
on Taiwan.
In April 2000, amendments were passed to transform the National Assembly from
a standing committee into an ad hoc body. The power of the Assembly to propose
amendments to the constitution was transferred to Legislative Yuan. Essentially the
National Assembly will meet only to approve a proposal made by the legislative Yuan
such as a motion to impeach the president or vice-president, issues on Taiwan’s territorial
boundaries, and constitutional amendments. 36
In August 2004, there was another series of constitutional amendments. There
were five main revisions. They are highlighted as follows:The number of the Seats in the
Legislative Yuan was reduced from 225 to 113 seats. The term of office for the
legislature was increased from three to four years. This is a welcome change because the
older system made it more likely for a divided government. 37 In addition, a single-
district two-vote system was implemented into the legislative election and finally the
power to vote on constitutional reform was transferred from the National Assembly to the
voters of Taiwan. These changes are found in Articles 1,2,4,5,8, and an addition was
36 Kilbinder Dosajh and Duncan Innes-ker, ed. Country Profile Taiwan (Wanchai, Hong Kong: The
Economist Intelligence Unit Limited, 2006), 10.
37 Yun-han Chu, "Taiwan’s Year of Stress," The Journal of Democracy 16, no. 2 (April 2005): 48.
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made to Article 12.38 The proposal was made on August 26th 2004, approved by the
National Assembly on June 7, 2005, and were ratified by the president making this
amendment the seventh revision of the constitution on June 10, 2005. Also in June the
National Assembly met for the last time and transferred its power to impeach the
president and the vice-president to the grand justices.
Perhaps the most significant amendment, at least in regards to current political
developments to the constitution, is the one that deals with the Legislative Yuan. Over the
past two constitutional revisions the power to the Legislative Yuan has been significantly
increased and functions more like how a legislative body should act. Also with 225
members the Legislature was overly large and less efficient than the newly reformed 113
seat version. After the revisions, the next Legislative Yuan election is scheduled for
December 2007. This election will be a battle that will go down in the history books.
Major parties KMT, DPP, PFP, and TSU all have a lot at stake in this election. Since the
number of seats is reduced to 113 there are not positions for everyone.
Potentially every seat is up for grabs and depending on how many seats a party
obtains will determine who has the majority in the legislature. It will also have an impact
on the 2008 Presidential election. These two elections combined will determine whether
Taiwan’s administration is more pro China should pan-blue win or more inclined toward
independence should pan-green win. The development of the political situation between
the KMT and the DPP is critical to identity development in Taiwan as the victors of
38 History of the Constitution of the Republic of China (Taiwan) [government document on-line] (Taipei,
Taiwan: Office of the President on ROC, 2006, accessed 2 April 2007); available from
http://constitution.president.gov.tw/en/law.htm; Internet. And The Legislative Yuan of R.O.C. History
[government document on-line] (Taipei, Taiwan: Legislative Yuan of R.O.C., 2006, accessed 2 April
2007); available from http://www.ly.gov.tw/ly/en/01_introduce/01_introduce_02.jsp?ItemNO=EN020000;
Internet.
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elections are the ones that determine political policy. Those who win the elections are
most likely to initiate programs and policies that reflect the attitudes and wishes of their
voting supporters. Since politics in Taiwan are highly motivated by national identity and
relations with China, KMT victories or (pan-blue victories) will initiate a trend for a more
positive appeal toward reunification and Chinese identity whereas DPP (pan-green)
victories will push in the opposites direction for more pro-independence and a stronger
nationalistic “Taiwanese” identity. The presence of political corruption has a major
impact on shifting identities. As we have mentioned before, political policies are
heavenly influenced as to which party is in the majority of power. In the same sense,
perception of political corruption has an equally significant factor on identity in Taiwan
as such perception influences voting trends in Taiwan. This will in turn influence who
will be in power to influence governmental policy. Chapter four discusses more in regard
to national identity and will provide an indication as to how green or blue the path of
Taiwan’s future may hold. Chapter four also indicates how the current administration,
mostly motivated by the pan-green, has brought about identity change within the island.
Chapter three discusses political corruption in Taiwan, another heated issue in Taiwan
domestic politics and identity formation.
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CHAPTER III
POLITICAL CORRUPTION
– A CONTROVERSY OVER BLACK GOLD
Along with the issue of national identity, political corruption is a heated issue in
Taiwan. Political development in regards to the DPP and the KMT has a direct
correlation to the issue of shifting identity. As mentioned in the previous chapter,
whichever political party is in power has the ability to affect government policy and there
for affect identity formation, so does political corruption or the perception of political
corruption play a key roll in identity change. Corruption is a critical issue in Taiwan
politics as the presence of and or perception of corruption influences voting trends in the
favor of parties which are seen by the public as less corrupt. As the issue of corruption
unfolds in this chapter, we will address that perception of corruption may hurt the success
of the leading presidential candidate and his party on allocations of corruption and
therefore possibly give the pan-green the leading edge in the 2007 Legislative Yuan and
2008 Presidential Election. Should such an event occur, it is reasonable to deduct that the
new administration will continue the policy of the current administration to shift identity
away from the mainland. Political corruption does and will continue to play a factor in
identity formation in Taiwan.
In 2006, there were three attempts to impeach President Chen Shui-bian when his
son-in-law and cabinet members were accused of insider trading and embezzlement. All
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attempts failed to gain the necessary votes in the Legislative Yuan. Nevertheless, the
presence of such scandals have hurt the President’s and the DPP’s image as have
members of the pan-blue group. With political scandals abounding, it appeared that the
DPP would not fair well in the Legislative Yuan Election in December 2007 and the
presidential election of March 2008.
Ma Ying-jeou, the KMT’s superstar, former Mayor of Taipei and KMT Chairman,
looked very promising for winning the presidential election in 2008. Ma Ying-jeou is a
charismatic, handsome, and popular politician who during his years in office worked to
crack down on political corruption within the KMT party. He is against declaring de jure
independence, wants to increase business ties with the mainland, and is the more popular
candidate in Beijing. With the support of the pan-blue alliance it seemed difficult for
other candidates to compete with Ma. However, in recent months, the tables have turned
and the battle for the Legislative Yuan and the presidency has just become a little more
difficult.
The Indictment
On February 13, 2007, Ma Ying-jeou was indicted for corruption charges for
siphoning “special allowances” during his term as Taipei Mayor. Taiwan High Court
Prosecutor Office spokesman Chang Wen-cheng told a press conference on the 12th that
“Ma Ying-jeou is suspected of embezzling a total of NT$11 million [US$333,000], and
he has been indicted on corruption charges,” 1 Ma had prior noted that if indicted he
would step down as the KMT Chairman. On February 13th Ma officially announced his
1 Hsiu-chuan Shih, "Ma asks corrupt mayor to step down; NO DOUBLE STANDARD: The KMT chief
said that the Keelung mayor must step down after his conviction for corruption, while Hsu Tsai-li vowed he
would not quit," Taipei Times, 28 September 2006, accessed 16 March 2007. Available from Factiva.
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resignation as KMT Chairman. Within two hours of his resignation, Ma also announced
his bid for president in 2008. Ma was quoted at KMT Headquarters, “At this moment,
when democracy has been mortally wounded, when social justice does not prevail, I
hereby solemnly declare that I will turn anger into strength without hesitation, and enter
the 2008 presidential race.” 2
Ma’s indictment and bid for presidency has created a great controversy regarding
Ma’s character and the credibility of the KMT Party. Ma’s image of clean fighting
corruption within the government has become tainted through himself being blamed for
misusing government funds. Chang Wen-cheng said that from December 1998 to July
2006 Ma deposited approximately half of his special monthly allowance just around the
figure of US$ 5,151 directly into a personal account. 3 Prosecutors found that Ma still had
$338,673 of the special funds in his and his wife’s bank account. 4 Chang also noted,
“Ma's monthly salary was about NT$150,000, but he deposited NT$200,000 into his wife,
Chou Mei-chin's, bank accounts every month.” 5 For this reason prosecutors said they
believed Ma used the public funds for private purposes.
When prosecutors questioned Ma, he indicated that he understood that mayoral
allowances were supposed to be used on public affairs. Prosecutors concluded that Ma
understood keeping the money in a private account was illegal and therefore Ma
intentionally had taken the money. If convicted Ma would face a minimum of seven years
in prison. The official investigation into Ma’s mayoral allowance is scheduled to begin on
2 Ibid.
3 Note: For the purpose of this paper all monetary amounts will be illustrated in U.S. dollars. The exchange
raito is as follows: 1 US$ = 33NT$. NT$ stands for New Taiwan Dollar. (US$ 5,151 = NT$ 170,000)
4 Rich Changand and Yan-chih, Hsiu-chuan Shih, "Ma indicted, quits as KMT chair; `MR. CLEAN' GETS
DIRTY," Taipei Times, 14 September 2007, accessed 18 March 2007. Available from Factiva.
5 Ibid.
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April 3, 2007. 6 If a conviction were to come out before next year’s presidential election,
it could seriously affect Ma’s and KMT’s chances at the presidency in 2008. The
controversy regardless of the results could hurt the outcome for the pan-blue. Already in
Taiwan, the Ma scandal has become a hot topic in politics and society. 7
What makes this topic so controversial is a combination of two factors. First, Ma
has been considered a clean politician, one who fights corruption, not one who takes part
in corruption. Being convicted would hurt him at the core of his political career. The
heart of this political fiasco involves a word commonly known in Taiwan as Black Gold (
黑金). The term is used to describe illegal actions of money laundering by politicians or
government officials. The KMT has been historically known for using its political power
to illegally obtain funds. 8 In recent years, political scandals regarding black gold, misuse
of public funds, have impinged on major political parties and individuals including the
president, his aides, and even his wife. More so than during the early years of the
Republic of China, politicians are being held accountable for their actions.
Political corruption has a heavy influence on how citizens choose to cast their
votes. The Economist Intelligence Unit states the following regarding political corruption
perception within Taiwan:
The perception of corruption has played a part in Taiwan’s elections since democratization began
in the 1990s. In 2000, a split in the KMT allowed the DPP under Mr. Chen to form the first non-
Nationalist administration. Although disarray among the Nationalists at the time proved the
decisive factor, the DPP attracted support from swing voters’ discontent with the KMT’s lack of
responsiveness to public concerns over graft [black gold] after 50 years of rule. The KMT was
6
"Taiwan opposition leader Ma goes on trial next month," Agence France Presse, 13 March 2007,
accessed 16 March 2007. Available from Factiva.
7 Ibid.
8 Kilbinder Dosajh and Duncan Innes-ker, ed. Country Report Taiwan Wanchai, Hong Kong: The
Economist Intelligence Unit Limited (February 2007), 15. See also, Denny Roy, Taiwan a political history
(Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2003), 184.
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perceived as corrupt and arrogant by some of its own supporters, who voted for the DPP as a
protest against their own party. 9
The black gold scandals over DPP members and the president have hurt the image of the
DPP last year. However, with recent developments the KMT is put back under the
spotlight for corruption allegations. Ma, having been known as a “clean politician” is
fighting to preserve his image but that task may prove more difficult than perceived.
The KMT Black-Gold Exclusion Clause
As stated earlier, the KMT has a history of black gold corruption. In order to
improve the KMT’s image the party began a crackdown on corruption within the party.
The biggest attempt to counteract black gold was on August 19, 2005 when the KMT
passed the KMT black-gold exclusion clause (排黑條款) and added it into their party
charter. Ma Ying-jeou was a key figure in the development and establishment of the
clause. “The black gold exclusion clause was formulated by the Central Standing
Committee and revised under Ma's chairmanship to state that any party member who is
indicted should be suspended.” 10 The basis for this movement was based on the people of
Taiwan’s dissatisfaction with political corruption. According to Dafydd Fell, political
corruption was ranked third among the list of social problems considered significant by
most Taiwan voters. 11
The Black Gold Exclusion Clause is stated in Chapter 12 Discipline, Awards and
Punishment of the KMT Party Charter. The clause that is of particular interest in this
9 Kilbinder Dosajh and Duncan Innes-ker, ed. Country Report Taiwan Wanchai, Hong Kong: The
Economist Intelligence Unit Limited (November 2006), 15.
10 Rich Changand, Ibid.
11 Dafydd Fell, "Success and Failure of New Parties in Taiwanese Elections," China: An International
Journal 3, no. 2 (Sep. 2005): 226.
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study is Article 43 since it is related to crimes and punishments. The article states the
following:
Any party member who violates the Organized Crime Prevention Act, Hoodlum Prevention Act,
Narcotics Prevention Act, Guns, Ammunition and Knives Control Act, Money Laundering
Prevention Act, Corruption Punishment Act, Presidential and Vice Presidential Election and
Recall Act, or incites a riot, uses the threat of forces, or commits election bribery under the Public
Officials Election and Recall Act, commits election bribery under the Farmers’ Association Act or
Fishermen’s Association Act, commits a sexual crime cited under Article 2 of the Sexual
Violations Prevention Act, becomes involved n the sex trade of children or juveniles under the
Child and Juvenile Sex Trade Prevention Act, or commits homicide, aggravated injury, robbery,
misappropriation, fraud, perjury, blackmail, or kidnapping for ransom under the Criminal Code,
having been convicted by a court of justice, whether final or not, shall forfeit the right to take part
in the party primary, nor shall he/she be nominated by the party; nor may he/she stand for
elections for members of committees or delegates to party assemblies at various party
headquarters; These restrictions shall not apply to party members accused of any of the violations
listed above but acquitted in a final ruling prior to the holding of primaries or registration for
elections. 12
The part of this clause that is most significant is, “having been convicted by a court of
justice, whether final or not, shall forfeit the right to take part in the party primary, nor
shall he/she be nominated by the party; nor may he/she stand for elections for members
of committees.” According to the party charter politicians become ineligible to be
nominated by the party if they are convicted by the first level court. In legal procedure,
they are entitled to appeal, and might be able to have the initial verdict changed. However,
even though they are acquitted by the final verdict according to the party charter they are
not eligible to become nominated.
A guilty verdict before the 2008 election would be what would hurt Ma publicly
and legally according to the party charter. Ma would become ineligible to be nominated
by the KMT for the 2008 presidency as the charter currently states. In all likelihood, there
is a great possibility that a verdict won’t be reached before the time of the election.
However, should such instance occur and if Ma still chose to run for presidency, it would
12 Kuomintang Party Charter [party charter on-line] (Taipei, Taiwan: Kuomintang, 2006, accessed 16
March 2007); available from http://www.kmt.org.tw/EN_category/eng_category4.html; Internet. To see the
full version of the KMT Party Charter Chapter 12 please see Appendix B.
33
mean that he would have to run as an independent against the KMT candidate. Such a
situation could cause a similar KMT split as did in the 2000 presidential election. When
James Soong (宋楚瑜) chose to run as an independent against the KMT candidate Lien
Chan (連戰); it created just enough of a divide to give Chen the winning victory. 13 A
repeat of the 2000 election is the last thing KMT wants to see happen.
On the same evening of Ma’s indictment the KMT Central Standing Committee,
the highest decision making body within the KMT, decided to repeal the Black Gold
Exclusion Clause so as to prevent Ma from being ineligible for the party’s president
candidacy in 2008. 14 In addition, “The party is further planning to amend a regulation
that suspends the membership of a person convicted of corruption in a first trial, in June,
in an effort to retain Ma as a presidential candidate for the party in next year's presidential
election.” 15 Ma may be able to run on the KMT ticket for presidency but there is no
telling how much doing so may hurt Ma or the KMT.
KMT’s action to annul the clause, which was originally introduced under Ma’s
Chairmanship, seems to contradict the very purpose of having the clause. It may send a
message to the public that, “Yes, rules do apply to KMT and its members, that is, when it
is convenient to do so.” 16 Previous members of the KMT who violated the clause such
as Hsinchu County Commissioner Cheng Yung-chin (鄭永金) and Legislator Chang
Chang-tsair (張昌財) may have their membership reinstated. If the KMT further amends
their regulations in June to not suspend membership to the party until a conviction is
13 Kilbinder Dosajh and Duncan Innes-ker, ed. Country Profile Taiwan (Wanchai, Hong Kong: The
Economist Intelligence Unit Limited, 2006), 6.
14 Rich Changand, Ibid.
15
"Ker takes a swipe at the `outdated' KMT," Taipei Times, 17 February 2007, accessed 16 March 2007.
Available from Factiva.
16 This is the author’s interpretation of the KMT’s choice to repeal the exclusion clause.
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made after appeals, then the former Keelung Mayor Hsu Tsai-li (許財利) may also
technically be eligible to reapply for membership into the party. Mr. Hsu was convicted
for corruption in September 2006 for using his political power to sell a plot of land to the
Keelung City Government bus department. “Ma, who was party chairman at the time,
urged Hsu to resign.” 17
In addition to Mr. Hsu, Ma Ying-jeou has condemned other politicians for
political corruption, particularly Chen Shui-bian. In 2006, Chen Shui-bian faced a series
of political corruption charges within his inner circle. During this period Ma was an
advocate for Chen to step down from his office. Ma was quoted in the Central News
Agency English News regarding a TV talk show violence incident saying, “everybody
hopes President Chen steps down, but the goal should never be pursued by violent
means." 18 In addition when asked in an interview regarding the Chen political scandal
Ma responded by saying, “We don't feel pride in the President anymore. When he loses
the confidence and respect of the people, there is no way for him to lead the country. 19
The premise for losing confidence and respect was based on Chen being accused of the
scandal. Ironically on February 13th, Ma Ying-jeou was accused of essentially the same
thing; and although Ma did keep his promise, of stepping down as the KMT Chairman
should he be indicted, he turned around and said he would run for president in 2008.
17 Hsiu-chuan Shih, Editorial: Ma tosses out his trump card [newspaper on-line] (Taipei, Taiwan: Taipei
Times, 16 February 2007, accessed 10 March 2007); available from
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2007/02/16/2003349266; Internet. Also see, Hsiu-
chuan Shih, "Ma asks corrupt mayor to step down; NO DOUBLE STANDARD: The KMT chief said that
the Keelung mayor must step down after his conviction for corruption, while Hsu Tsai-li vowed he would
not quit," Taipei Times, 28 September 2006, accessed 16 March 2007. Available from Factiva.
18 Deborah Kuo, " KMT CHAIRMAN CONDEMNS TV TALK SHOW VIOLENCE," Central news
Agency English News, 2 August 2006, accessed 16 March 2007. Available from Factiva.
19 Zoher Abdoolcarim and Natalie Tso, " 10 Questions For Ma Ying-jeou," Time International Asia Ed 17, no.
168 ( 17 July 2006 ) accessed 16 March 2007. Available from Factiva.
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When the KMT Central Standing committee repealed the black-gold exclusion clause
there was no major opposition by the Ma camp. Of course should Ma be successful in the
2008 election, both the KMT and Ma would benefit from this move in the short-term by
regaining control over the administration. However, should voters see this move as a
return of corruption things will not bode well for KMT and Ma, should he run as the
party’s presidential candidate in 2008. Wu Po-hsiung, the acting KMT chairman after
Ma stepped down, was questioned whether or not Ma’s indictment was the leading reason
for the KMT to repel the clause. He replied that it wasn’t repealed specifically to favor
Ma; however, he admitted that Ma’s indictment did create a “sense of crisis.” 20
Meanwhile when a Democratic Progressive Party Caucus Ker Chien-ming was asked of
his impressions of Ma declaring his candidacy immediately following his indictment he
replied, "It is like ... a thief declaring he would like to become a police officer when he
gets arrested." 21
The Future Path and Identity Formation
With the recent political scandals within the DPP the up coming Legislative Yuan
and presidential election looked like it might not be a very good year for Taiwan’s pro
independence party; however, with recent allegations against Ma Ying-jeou and
questions revolving around the integrity of the KMT this may boost support for the pan-
green. This year when the Legislative Yuan decreases its number of seats from 225 to
113, stakes are particularly high for both sides of the spectrum. The next two elections
will have a major impact on the next four years of Taiwan’s development as it will decide
20 Ibid.
21 Flora Wang and Hsiu-chuan Shih, "Parties react to indictment with bluster; DEVIL OR ANGEL? :
Politicians were quick to judge yesterday, either condemning Ma as a criminal receiving his just desserts or
labeling him a victim of `political oppression'," Taipei Times, 14 February 2007, accessed 18 February
2007. Available from Factiva.
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which party will be in charge of the administration, who will be the majority in the
legislature, and will greatly influence government policy regarding China and cross strait
relations potentially for the next four years. This year along with national identity,
national security, relations with China, and social welfare, political corruption will be a
critical issue that politicians will have to address. How these politicians respond to
political corruption in Taiwan and within their own parties will be monitored and will
ultimately be held accountable by the voters since their votes will be the final deciding
factor of who takes power at the end of 2007 and early 2008.
Perhaps the former mayor of Taipei, also former Chairman of the KMT, Ma
Ying-jeou is best to have comment on the future of politics in Taiwan. The following is a
quote from Ma when asked how he cracked down on political corruption within the KMT.
We have set up a "clean government" commission to monitor our officials. When I was justice
minister more than 12 years ago, I cracked down on corruption and vote-buying. I have a
reputation for being clean and impartial, [and] we know that how clean we are determines our
future. 22
Mr. Ma couldn’t have said it better than himself, “How clean we are determines our
future.” The perception of corruption in Taiwan politics will have a significant factor in
determining the upcoming elections. Ma, as well as other politicians, will have a difficult
battle ahead with not only having to address the right key issues but also having to
balance personal and party perception. Although in recent years we have seen an
onslaught of political corruption accusations it is a significant improvement compared to
the early years of the ROC administration. Nevertheless, how political corruption in
Taiwan is perceived by the people will highly influence the results of major elections.
How people vote will determine which party takes control of the Legislative Yuan and
22 Zoher Abdoolcarim and Natalie Tso, " 10 Questions For Ma Ying-jeou," Time International Asia Ed 17,
no. 168 ( 17 July 2006 ) accessed 16 March 2007. Available from Factiva.
37
the presidency. Those elected into power will further influence identity formation on the
island by: adapting policies in favor or against mainland reunification, influencing
revisions of educational textbooks, and will set the stage for the next four years of cross-
strait relations. Chapter four discuses, in greater detail, the current ROC administration
attempts to redefine Taiwanese identity or to at least to distinguish differences between
the PRC and the ROC.
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CHAPTER IV
PUBLIC POLLS AND IDENTITY CHANGE
Since the early 1990s, the Republic of China on Taiwan has been undergoing a
gradual, but radical change in identity and self-perception. Part of this transformation has
come about through government efforts to distinguish the nation’s identity from that of
the mainland and efforts to gain recognition in the international community. Because of
PRC’s policy toward the ROC, the ROC is banned from most international organizations
that require statehood for membership. According to the 2006 National Defense Report
all these factors have, “aggravated the people in Taiwan to feel antipathy towards the
PRC administration.”
1 Another part comes from generations of the old Taiwanese and new Taiwanese living
and intermarrying together on the island and developing a new concept of what it means
to be Taiwanese.
New and Old Identities on Taiwan
To begin, let’s identify what we mean by “old” and “new” Taiwanese.
Traditionally, “old Taiwanese” refers to bensheng ren (本省人) and “new Taiwanese”
refers to waisheng ren (外省人).2 Bensheng ren means those originally from the
providence or Taiwan. It refers to those Chinese that came to Taiwan between 1624 up
1 National Defense Report The Republic of China (Taipei, Taiwan: Ministry of National Defense, R.O.C.,
2006), 40.
2 Mellissa J. Brown, Is Taiwan Chinese? the impact of culture, power, and migration on changing identities
(Berkeley and Los Angeles, California: University of California Press, 2004), 7-13. Here in referred to as
“Brown.”
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until 1945. It also includes the original inhabitants of the island, the aboriginals.
Waisheng ren refers to those Chinese who came from the mainland to Taiwan after 1945,
generally speaking these people are the soldiers of the Republic of China (China) that
came to occupy Taiwan after it was returned to China when Japan lost WWII as well as
remnants of Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist government and military officers when they
fled China to Taiwan after their defeat by Mao Zedong (毛澤東) and the Chinese
Communist Party. Between 1945 through 1949, around one to two million of these
waisheng ren or “mainlanders” of the national government permanently moved to
Taiwan. This group of people made up roughly 13% of the Taiwan population while the
native Taiwanese or bensheng ren made up around 85% of the population.3
Regardless of the majority of the population being bensheng ren, the waisheng
ren were the ones who maintained control of all central government affairs. So from the
40s to the end of the 70s there was significant difference between the two peoples.
However, as years passed the waisheng ren intermarried with the local native Taiwanese
as well, as the older generation that came from China slowly began to pass away. Their
children whether a mixture between waisheng ren and bensheng ren or simply bensheng
ren were born and raised in Taiwan with their connections to China growing distant. The
people gradually began to identify themselves as Taiwanese.
Taiwanese is a name that relates to those who came from Fijian Providence prior
to 1945 who speak Minan also know as Taiwanese. Traditionally, in order to be
considered Taiwanese it was thought that one must be able to speak Taiwanese. Now
since the differences between waisheng ren and bensheng ren have become less and less
3 Kilbinder Dosajh and Duncan Innes-ker, ed. Country Profile Taiwan (Wanchai, Hong Kong: The
Economist Intelligence Unit Limited, 2006), 5.
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and the attitude toward what it means to be Taiwanese has changed, people now tend to
consider themselves Taiwanese if the are born in Taiwan. Although speaking Taiwanese
is also a characteristic to identify one as Taiwanese the protocol for identifying one as
Taiwanese has changed somewhat. Waisheng ren are traditionally considered unable to
speak Taiwanese; however, even they and other bensheng ren see their descendants as
having Taiwanese identity.
Threats from the PRC have also contributed to the Taiwanese Identity. In March
1996 prior to the first direct presidential election, the PRC conducted live military
exercises off the coast of Taiwan’s shore as an attempt to influence the outcome of the
presidential election. 4 Their attempts had the opposite affect as their unfavored candidate;
Lee Tung-hui was elected as president. In a public survey conducted by The Election
Study Center of National Chengchi University, shortly after China’s test it was found that
the number of Taiwanese who identified themselves as Chinese dropped dramatically. 5
Equally so prior to the 2000 Election the PRC issued a White Paper declaring that if
Taiwan further delayed negotiations for unification that would provide justification for
China to invade Taiwan. Furthermore, on March 16th, days before the election, China’s
prime minister, Zhu Rongji, warned the Taiwan people not to elect people who favor
independence referring to Chen Shui-bian. 6 Ironically, China’s statements may have
helped Chen gain the necessary marginal votes needed for victory.
Andrew Peterson paints a vivid picture of a social trend evolving in Taiwan over
the past several decades.
4 Brown, Ibid., 239-240.
5 See table 5 on page 65. Sources were obtained from Results of Recent Elections in the R.O.C. [statistics
on-line] (Taipei, Taiwan: Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, 2006, accessed 2 April
2007); available from http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/eng/data/1993%7E2004eng.pdf; Internet.
6 Brown, Ibid., 240.
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As new generations of people with no ties to the mainland rise to power, Taiwan is growing
further and further from China. The ethnic ties that once bound the futures of the two sides are
aging, while the political divide continues to grow between them. Independence is no longer just
the dream of anti-mainland ethnic Taiwanese; many now see it as a natural outcome of Taiwan’s
democratic growth. With the comfortable majority in support of the status quo now shrinking,
ignoring these developments is neither prudent nor wise, and adjusting to them will require more
than minor changes in U.S. policy. Taiwan’s next generation does not see its future in China. 7
Although the premise of this thesis is not to argue that Taiwan is set on de jure
independence, rather the identity of the Taiwanese people is constantly evolving. How
the people saw themselves in the past and how they see themselves today has been
changing. Looking at table six we can see that since 1992 to 2006 the public opinion
regarding the most popular decision was to maintain status quo and decide what to do at a
later date.8 While attitudes toward independence versus unification have not changed
drastically, there has been a gradual decreasing trend in pro-unification as their attitudes
to maintaining status quo and move toward independence has increased gradually.
Take a second look at table 5. It is clear that there has been a significant increase
in Taiwanese identity from 1992 to 2006. In 1992, 45% of the people saw themselves as
Chinese. In 2006 that number increased to 44%. Conversely association with Chinese
identity dropped from 26% to 6.2%. Identity of being both Taiwanese as relatively
remained constant at 44%. While people still associate themselves as both Chinese and
Taiwanese the Taiwanese identity has increased greatly.
The Meaning of Chinese
However, a word of caution; there are many different interpretations of the word
Chinese. As for the Election Study Center’s surveys the word they use to refer to Chinese
7Andrew Peterson, "Dangerous Games across the Taiwan Strait," The Washington Quarterly 27, no. 2 (
Spring 2004 ): 28.
8 See table 6 on page 66. Source was obtained from Changes in the Unification Independence Stance of
Taiwanese as Tracked in Surveys by Election Study Center, NCCU (1994-2006). [statistics on-line] (Taipei,
Taiwan: Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, important political attitude trend distribution
2006, accessed 2 April 2007); available from http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/eng/data/data03-3.htm; Internet.
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is chungguo ren (中國 人). Chungguo ren can mean the following, “one who comes from
China, but more often it refers to those whose nationality is the Peoples’ Republic of
China.” Another word for “Chinese” chunghwa minzu(中華民族) in China the term
refers to “all those of the Chinese nation” as it was by the KMT.9 However, the word
chunghwa minzu outside China is a term which generally means ethnic Chinese or those
coming from Han decent. Moreover, there are different terms in which English identifies
as “Chinese” and from those words there can be very different interpretations as to their
meaning. 10
Up until the late 70s, the Republic of China asserted itself as the legitimate
government of all of China. After the United Nations recognized the PRC and the US and
other major nations switched diplomatic relations from Taipei over to Beijing, the
Kuomintang could no longer claim that they were the legitimate government over the
mainland. Even so many of the governmental organizations still retained names that
reflected the countries past. Today the Republic of China is more frequently known in the
international community as “Taiwan” than the “Republic of China.” Although the official
name of mainland China is the “Peoples’ Republic of China” many people have confused
the Republic of China for China because of the word “China” in the official name.
Government Initiated Name Alterations
As part of the Taiwan government’s efforts to reduce confusion and, in this
author’s opinion, in an effort to assert the nation’s own identity and sovereignty into the
9 Brown, Ibid., 22.
10 According to the Election Study Center’s survey 44% of Taiwanese see themselves as Taiwanese and
another 44% percent of Taiwanese see themselves as both Taiwanese and Chinese while the population that
sees themselves as only Chinese is on a sharp decline. It would be interesting to do a study that looked into
how Taiwanese interpret the word “Chinese” and how they relate that word to their own identities. Such a
study would help further understanding of Taiwan’s complex identity struggle.
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international community on September 1, 2003 Taiwan issued new passports with the
name “Taiwan” printed on the cover, see Figure 1. Although there may have been some
political motivations behind the name change it was mainly done for practical reasons.
According to Minister of Foreign Affairs Eugene Chien (簡
又新), his ministry decided on the change because foreign
immigration officials and air carriers often mistake "Republic
of China" for "People's Republic of China," China's official
name, which often causes trouble for passport holders from
Taiwan.11
Figure 1.Republic of China Adds “Taiwan” to Cover
The Taiwan government has also made other moves to change names within the
government that have reference to China. On February 12, 2007 the government
officially changed its name from “Chunghwa Post Company” (中華郵政) to “Taiwan
Post Company” (台灣郵政). 12 This has been met with great controversy within Taiwan
as the name change trend has been pushed by the pan-green while pan-blue is in
opposition of the name change. Former KMT Party Chairman Ma Ying-jeou vowed that
if KMT won the 2008 Presidential election that this party would “restore the words of
Republic of China.” 13 The argument for the name change is the same as the reason for
the passport name addition and that is to avoid confusing Taiwan for the mainland China.
Overseas postal workers have often confused the Republic of China for being the
11
"Taiwan' passport doesn't impact US," Taipei Times, 15 June 2003, accessed 6 April 2007. Available
from Factiva.
12 Hsiu-chuan Shih, " Name-change controversy: Ma vows to reverse stamp move; STAMPED OUT: The
KMT chairman said that if elected president, he would put a stop to issuing stamps labeled with 'Taiwan'
because they will 'only cause more confusion'," Taipei Times, 13 February 2007, accessed 18 February
2007. Available from Factiva.
13 Ibid.
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mainland. Figure two shows the before and after photos of the post office. The photo on
the right shows the before, and the photo on the left shows the after. 14
Before (ChunghwaPost ) After (Taiwan Post)
Figure 2.Chunghwa Post Becomes Taiwan Post
On February 28, 2007 the Taiwan Post came out with their first, ever stamp with
the name Taiwan on it. 15 All previous stamps bore the name “Republic of China.” The
stamp that was issued is particularly significant because it commemorates the 2:28
Incident of those who were murdered because of the oppressive Nationalist government.
The 2:28 Incident also bares symbolism for Taiwan self governance, self-determination,
and independence. It commemorates the day that the Taiwanese people revolted against
an oppressive regime. In figure three, a picture of the stamp is shown on the right. The
building in the picture is of the Taipei 2:28 Memorial Museum. The picture on the right is
an example of the old stamps with the name of the “Republic of China” showing on the
front.
14 Taiwan Post official name change 台灣郵政 正名揭牌 [newspaper on-line] (Taipei, Taiwan: Dajiyuan
大紀元, 13 February 2007, accessed 3 April 2007); available from
http://www.epochtimes.com/b5/7/2/13/n1621591.htm; Internet.
15 Hsiu-chuan Shih, " Name-change controversy: Ma vows to reverse stamp move; STAMPED OUT: The
KMT chairman said that if elected president, he would put a stop to issuing stamps labeled with 'Taiwan'
because they will 'only cause more confusion'," Taipei Times, 13 February 2007, accessed 18 February
2007. Available from Factiva.
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Figure 3. 2:28 Stamp Bears the Name “Taiwan” (Shown on the right.)
Other companies which bore the word “China” in their name have been going
through or considering the name change process. On the same day as Chunghwa Post’s
name change, China Petroleum Company, CPC (中国石油), formerly owned by the ROC
Government, changed their to CPC, Taiwan (台灣中油)16 This was so that people
confuse the company with mainland. CPC’s original name the word chungguo (中國) in
it, which by most people is interpreted to be mainland China. The new name still bares
the character chung (中) in its name but that is because some other company already had
the name Taiwan Oil (台灣石油). 17
16 Shu-ling Ko, "Pro-independence group says Ma unfit to be president," Taipei Times, 14 February 2007,
accessed 18 February 2007. Available from Factiva.
17 See figure 4. Note “after” picture was obtained from the following source. Taiwan Abian says he hopes
the new name of CPC, Taiwan refelcts reality 台灣中油揭牌 扁：追求名實相副 [newspaper on-line]
(Taipei, Taiwan: Dajiyuan 大紀元, 13 February 2007, accessed 3 April 2007); Available from
http://www.epochtimes.com/b5/7/2/13/n1621617.htm; Internet.
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Before After
Figure 4. China Petroleum Company Changes Name to CPC, Taiwan
Another case in which Taiwan is going through a name change trend is with its
license plate identification. This case in particular has received less attention from the
media. However it is intriguing all the same. Perhaps the reason behind less media
attention is because instead of changing the name from China to Taiwan or adding the
name Taiwan, in this incident the name is simply removed. When Chiang Kai-shek
established his government on Taiwan, it was intended only to be temporary. At least in
the psychological sense, to preserve the ROC as the legitimate government of all of
China, Chiang established the capital in Taipei and dubbed Taiwan a “province” of China.
Along with having Taiwan as a province a position was created to govern the province. 18
In Taiwan, there are three different types of license plates in regards to location.
The two largest cities, Taipei and Kaoshiung, have their names on the top of the license
plates. Everywhere else the license plates read Taiwan Province, Taiwan shen (台灣省).
When one reads the plate in Chinese it is very common for one interpret the plate as
Taiwan belonging to the mainland. However, this year the ministry of Transportation has
18 U.S. Department of State, Background Note: Taiwan [posting on-line] (Washington D.C., United States:
U.S. Department of State, 2005, accessed 25 09 2006); available from
http:/www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35855.htm; Internet.
47
stopped producing plates with the words “Taiwan shen.” Instead the plates are being
produced with no name at all only the license number, see figure five. 19 In doing so it
may also gradually erase impressions that Taiwan is part of China.
Figure 5. License Plate Name Removal
Currently the Taiwan government is going through an anti-Chiang Kai-shek
campaign trying to remove his name and image from government and public sectors. On
March 13th Kaoshiung City removed a statue of Chiang Kai-shek in front of the Chiang
Kai-shek Memorial Hall. This came about by an administrative order issued by
Kaoshiung Mayor Chen Chu (陳菊) of the Democratic Progressive Party. As a result,
“the Chiang Kai-shek Culture Center was renamed Kaohsiung City Culture Center.” 20
The name change did not require approval from the city council. The decision to change
the name and remove the statue has put political parties in the pan-blue and pan-green at
odds against each other. More than 400 police officers were called to maintain order
while the city removed the statue.
19 Please note that the green color plate represents motor cycles that have 50 cc engines. White plates
represent bikes with engines larger than 50 cc. The colors do not have any relation to the name change.
Automobiles along with motorcycles as of January 2007 no longer show “Taiwan shen” on the plates.
20 Flora Wang, "KMT, DPP at odds over Kaohsiung's CKS center," Taipei Times, 15 March 2007, accessed
16 March 2007. Available from Factiva.
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The Chiang Kai-shek Culture Center was renamed in the midst of a controversy;
meanwhile, in the state capital another battle has been begun over the name and status of
two major historical markers the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall and Sun Yat-sen
Memorial Hall. The political drive behind the name change campaign is “to replace the
China-related symbols of the old regime with distinct Taiwanese emblems and to redefine
the role of the late dictator.” 21 The DPP wants to change the name of the Chiang Kai-
shek Memorial Hall to “National Taiwan Democracy Memorial Hall.” Prior to the name
change they plan to dismantle the artistic walls that surround the complex.
In order to go through with the name change as planned, the Memorial Hall must
have a decrease in its status from third-level administrative unit to fourth-level
administrative unit. According to Chu Nan-hsien, director general of the Ministry of
Education’s (MOE) Department of Social Education said that for a name change in any
third-level administrative unity requires an “organic statutes” to be drafted and submitted
to the Legislative Yuan. Administrative unity fourth-level authority to change names is
left to the Cabinet. In order to downgrade the hall from three to four the existing
“Organic Statues for Management of the Chiang Kai-sheck Memorial hall” must be
abolished. To do so first the MOE’s Law and Regulation Commission and then the
Cabinet must approve the petition and then the Legislative Yuan would be asked to
21 Hsiu-chuan Shih, " KMT calls on disgruntled employees to attend demo," Taipei Times, 13 March 2007,
accessed 16 March 2007. Available from Factiva.
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nullify the statutes. 22 On March 31, 2006 the KMT had a rally in front of the Memorial
Hall in protest against the name-change campaign to change the name of the hall. 23
On another note, the Ministry of Education is making plans to change the content
that students study in their textbooks. Traditionally, history books focused most of their
attention on mainland history. Now Ministry is radically changing how Taiwanese
children will study history. The Ministry wants to focus on more relevant issues to
Taiwan. According to the Central News Agency, “Information on Taiwan will be
increased to 50 percent of material presented in local social studies textbooks by 2008
under a Ministry of Education program to deepen understanding of Taiwan.” 24 Up until
now, students studied more regarding China’s long historical past than historical topics
relating to Taiwan.
China’s Reaction
In recent years China has seen Taiwan as trying to avoid, delay, and or even
prevent unification with the mainland. The relationship between China and Taiwan is
bitter sweet. Politically, relations between government to government are “officially”
non-existent as tensions over affirming or disaffirming the One-China Policy keep dialog
to a minimum. China has set a hard line policy for negotiations. China encourages dialog
but only on its terms. The ROC on Taiwan has not been so responsive in China’s efforts
of persuasion and has, thus, created tension between the two parties.
22
"DPP seeking to downgrade memorial halls," China Posts, 10 March 2007, accessed 16 March 2007.
Available from Factiva. DPP seeking to downgrade memorial halls The China Post Staff 10 March 2007
2007/3/16
23 KMT ready to rally against a anti-Chiang moves Mo Yan-chih [newspaper on-line] (Taipei, Taiwan:
Taipei Times, 31 March 2007, accessed 31 March 2007); available from
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2007/03/31/2003354665; Internet.
24
"Education Ministry Wants More Taiwan Content in Textbooks by 2008," Central News Agency English
News, 9 September 2004, accessed 20 09 2006. Available from Factiva.
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The One-China Policy has caused setbacks for the ROC government as nations
have chosen to normalize their relations with the PRC, and in doing so must sever official
relations with the ROC. Regardless of this fact, the ROC today still enjoys de facto
sovereignty completely independent of Beijing authorities. China fears one day that the
ROC might declare independence and, therefore, has taken whatever precautions it can to
prevent such actions.
Perhaps the most recent and significant action China has taken to prevent de jure
independence on Taiwan is the establishment of the Anti-Succession Law. On March 14,
2005 the People’s Republic of China enacted the Anti-Succession Law. 25 Previously
China had issued threatening statements, ran military test off the coast of Taiwan, and
blocked Taiwan’s entrance into international organizations which require statehood as
membership. This time it turned its policy toward Taiwan into legislation creating a legal
base to argue its legitimacy to prevent Taiwan from declaring independence and the use
of force if necessary.
The article maintains China’s stipulation that there is only one China and Taiwan
is part of that China. China encourages peaceful reunification. However, should the
possibilities of peaceful reunification be exhausted China reserves the right to use force.
The majority of the document seems to have a positive tone where China encourages
dialog, exchange, and promotes fundamental interest of both parties of the strait.
However, in Article 8, it specifies that should all efforts of peaceful reunification be
exhausted or should Taiwan unilaterally act as to declare independence then China
25 Cheng-yi Lin and Wen-cheng Lin, "Democracy, Divided National Identity, and Taiwan’s National
Security," Taiwan Journal of Democracy 1, no. 2 (December 2005): 81.
51
reserves the right to use force to preserve the nation’s sovereignty. Article 8 reads as
follows.
In the event that the Taiwan independence secessionist forces should act under any name or by any
means to cause the fact of Taiwan secession from China, or that major incidents entailing Taiwan
secession from China should occur, or that possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be
completely exhausted, the state shall employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to
protect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. 26
According to international protocol, states are not supposed to be aggressors. If one
nation attacks another then the international community can use sanctions, or in a worst
case scenario, use military force as a form of deterrence against the aggressor. This is a
case in which state is against state. If the conflict is a domestic dispute international
protocol becomes more complicated. Since the aggressor is the state, in essence, acting
out punishment against its own citizens the international community has, theoretically,
less room to act since any interference with the state in question would be an
infringement on the states sovereignty. There are causes such as state sponsored genocide
where the international community can intervene. As a general rule, states do not
interfere directly with other state internal affairs. This rule is not always kept; but it is a
norm that states try to follow, if for any reason, because states do not want other states to
become involved in what is considered a domestic matter.
China has or is trying to make Taiwan just that, a domestic affair; and in China’s
opinion it rightfully should do so. Should China ever choose to invade Taiwan, China
could argue that this is a domestic affair in which we are following our law to solve the
problem. This is a domestic affair so, therefore, there should be no interference from
outside parties.
26 For the full version of the Anti-Secession Law see Appendix A. Shun-jie Ji, "China Anti-Secession Law:
A Test to Party Politics in Taiwan," Views & Policies 1, no. 4 (June. 2005): 20-24.
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The United States’ official policy on the One-China Policy is strategic status quo
or in other words no unilateral change in status for or against unification by China or
Taiwan. China’s decision to make its policy into law was seen by the United States as a
policy nonproductive to the cross strait relations. In March 2005 when Condoleezza Rice
visited China, she described the legislation as unhelpful in reducing cross-strait tensions
and that any unilateral moves would increase not decrees tensions. 27
US lawmakers also showed concern over such legislation that gives legal backing
into an invasion of Taiwan should Taiwan move toward independence. Shun-jie Ji
explains that, “The US House of Representatives voted 424-4 in favor of a resolution
warning that the anti-secession law alters the status quo in the region, and thus is of grave
concern to the US.” 28 Although the US does not support Taiwan officially declaring
independence neither does it condone unilateral actions by China to force or threaten
Taiwan into reunification.
China’s issuance of Anti-Secession Law may have not helped in Beijing’s overall
objective of reunification. Historically, when Beijing puts pressure on Taiwan the people
have reacted conversely to Beijing’s wishes. This was seen when President Lee was
elected in 1996 and then again in 2000 and 2004 when Chen was elected and reelected as
president. The choice of China to make its policy into law has not been received warmly
by the Taiwanese people. Although the legislation states that it wants to pursue peaceful
reunification the policy in itself is hostile allowing very little room for negotiations.
27 Shun-jie Ji, "China Anti-Secession Law: A Test to Party Politics in Taiwan," Views & Policies 1, no. 4
(June. 2005): 8. 
28 Shun-jie Ji, "China Anti-Secession Law: A Test to Party Politics in Taiwan," Views & Policies 1, no. 4
(June. 2005): 8. 
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According to Soochow University professor Lo Chih-cheng popular opinion in Taiwan
has a major impact on how Beijing decides its policies.
Popular opinion in Taiwan has also played more of a role in deciding the attitude and policies
Beijing adopts in dealing with Taiwan. If the legislature continues to be led by the pan-blue
alliance, then Beijing will continue to hope. If the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) loses next
year's election, Beijing will be even more confident. 29
Equally so, the United States also plays an important role in the development of cross-
strait relations.
Although political relations between Taiwan and China are in considerably poor
condition economically speaking there relationship couldn’t be better. China is Taiwan’s
largest trading partner. Logically it makes sense. The two countries are extremely close;
both countries speak the same language. “Taiwanese who travel to the PRC have an
advantage over other foreign investors – they can speak directly with people in China
without going through interpreter.” 30 Taiwan has a large supply of intellectual input
where as China offers cheap and affordable goods. Trade between Taiwan and China is
good and it is on the rise. Between 2005 and 2006 trade between Taiwan and China
increased by 18.2% in one year. Taiwan’s leading number of exports is to China as $43
million dollars. Hong Kong, also part of China, came in second at $34 million. The US
was third at $29 million. Conversely, Taiwan’s greatest number of imports came from
China, second, from Hong Kong, and third the US. According to the Taiwan Affairs
Office of China’s State Council, total trade between the countries was over US $100
billion in 2006. 31
29 Changqing Cao, "'Anti-Secession' Law has the opposite effect," Taipei Times, 16 March
2007, accessed 16 March 2007. Available from Factiva.
30 Brown, Ibid., 249.
31
"Education Ministry Wants More Taiwan Content in Textbooks by 2008," Central News Agency English
News, 9 September 2004, accessed 20 09 2006. Available from Factiva.
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Regardless of whether Taiwan becomes independent or reunites with China,
Taiwan needs to have a positive working relationship with China. As noted by Eric
Grove, “Taiwan’s economic development relies on foreign resources. Consequently,
Taiwan has to ensure the security of its lifeline at sea and to expand its diplomatic reach
and status in international society.” 32 In part of this statement means that Taiwan needs
to have a national defense and must protect her territory, but also in part it means Taiwan
needs to foster positive foreign relations among surrounding countries to insure security
around the perimeter of the island. As Yun-han Chu states about Taiwan’s unique
challenges as do many authors, there is “No long-term solution to the crisis of state
legitimacy is yet in sight.” 33 The relationship between Taiwan and China is a complex
and ever evolving issue in which both sides appear to have no certain agreement.
Taiwan’s identity, like any other country, is ever evolving. Taiwan was once an
authoritarian state in which it has evolved to become a full democracy where its people
decide on its leaders.
In regards to the development of a state and national identity, Cheng-yi Lin and
Wen-cheng Lin have an important observation. “It is important to note that identity is not
innate, but rather acquired, and that national identity does not exactly correspond with
ethnic identity.”34 Although China claims that Taiwan is an interacted part of China,
other nations such as Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia with Chinese populations claim
their identities as being Chinese while maintaining no claims that their nationality is tied
to the mainland. People, not genetics, determine a nation or sovereignty. A large
32Eric Grove. “A Comprehensive Assessment of Taiwan’s Sea Power” found in Martin Edmonds and
Michael M. Tsai, ed. Taiwan's Maritime Security (London, Great Britain: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 129.
33 Yun-han Chu, "Taiwan’s Unique Challenges," The Journal of Democracy 7, no. 3 (July 1996): 24.
34 Cheng-yi Lin and Wen-cheng Lin, "Democracy, Divided National Identity, and Taiwan’s National
Security," Taiwan Journal of Democracy 1, no. 2 (December 2005): 73.
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percentage of Taiwan’s heritage may come from China but that doesn’t mean that its
heritage also determines its destiny. Like Taiwan there was a time the Chinese
Communist Party the founders of the Peoples’ Republic of China fought for their right to
exist. Previously, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was considered a renegade regime
in which the CKS saw as a threat equal to that of the Japanese invaders to the Chinese
nation state.
It took persistence, perseverance, and a will of the people for the CCP to exist. As
Mao Zedong retreated on the long March he gained support from local people Mao’s
regime strengthened. Mao gained so much support that he was able to overthrow the
Nationalist and establish the Peoples’ Republic of China. A once renegade regime
became the legitimate political entity of an entire nation. This is not to say that Taiwan
can or should use force to assert its own identity but rather through the will of the people
regimes, sovereignty, and nation states are made and destroyed. In the same sense the
future of Taiwan lies in the hands of its people. As we have seen, the tendency for
independence has been increasing in Taiwan. China still has the potential for
reunification, but strategies it has used in the past have only hurt cross-strait relations. If
China wishes to woo Taiwan back into her arm, China must revamp its strategy and push
for more economic and social exchanges that benefit both the people of China and the
people of Taiwan.
Analysis
Identity in Taiwan is gradually shifting. This phenomenon is occurring because of
a variety of factors such as: the ROC’s attempts to preserve its existence/enhance the
islands political regimes recognition in the international community. Intermarriage
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between mainlanders and local Taiwanese, their offspring and mainlander offspring being
born and raised in Taiwan contribute to Taiwanese identity. Since 1949, the Republic of
China has been functioning completely independent from China. This long separation
from the Mainland and Taiwan has contributed to shifting identities. Although
previously in educational textbooks “Chinese” identity served a primary factor. Now
studies specifically relating to “Taiwan” are growing in priority.
The issue of Chinese identity is an increasingly perplexing issue. What does it
mean to be Chinese? Can one be both Taiwanese and Chinese? Previously in this chapter,
we discussed that the word “Chinese” can have varying meanings relating to, originating
from the mainland China, ethnic Chinese, and of having PRC citizenship. How do the
people in Taiwan view themselves? If they believe they are Chinese what does it mean to
them and to what degree do they see themselves Chinese? Is this idea of being Chinese
adaptable or a fixed concept? The concept of being Taiwanese was once considered of
having origins from southeast China and the ability to speak Minan. Now an increasing
population sees being “Taiwanese” as having ROC citizenship. In regards to Chinese
identity on Taiwan, there is much debate over how the population perceives this issue.
The Election Study Center has indicated that the number of people responding to surveys
on identity is declining further complicating the issue. Nevertheless to have a better
understanding of identity formation on Taiwan more studies need to be conducted.
If the current administration is successful in their name changes/
additions/omissions then this too will contribute to identity change as fewer and fewer
references to the mainland will be prevalent. The omission of “Taiwan shen” on licenses
plates is one indicating factor that the island is inching away from the identity of being
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subjective part of the PRC. Whether this trend will continue will largely be up to people
of Taiwan and will also be determined by their reactions to PRC and US interpretations
of their actions. In addition, the upcoming Legislative Yuan Election and the ROC
Presidential Election will be a major determining factor the identity development as the
people will essentially approve or disapprove the current identity shifting trend which is
presently going on with the current administration. Voting green will indicate a tendency
for approval of an increasing Taiwanese identity where voting blue will indicate a
tendency for a more conservative perspective and or leaning more toward pro-
reunification.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
Many scholars have said that there is no foreseen solution to the Taiwan Strait
crisis. This is an accurate statement since the future of Taiwan depends on politics in
Beijing, Washington, and Taiwan. Historically, Taiwan has been an island nation where
the residents on the island never had a direct say in government affairs. Since the 1980s
Taiwan has begun to evolve to become a full fledged democracy where major positions in
the ROC government are elected by the people and where more than one political party
compete in elections. Although major biases in mass media still do exist; people have
free access to information and are allowed to voice their opinions for and against the
government. Governmental Reforms, Chen’s years in office, political corruption, and
popular opinion have all contributed to Taiwan’s shifting identity.
Governmental Reforms
In regards to governmental reform, the first major change came about when the
Kuomintang allowed the illegal opposition political party, the Democratic Progressive
Party, to come into existence. Nineteen eighty-six was the first year that the DPP was
allowed to run in National Assembly and Legislative Yuan elections, marking the first
true two party contests in Taiwan’s history. In 1992, the National Assembly passed a
number of constitutional amendments which included having popular elections for
mayors of Taipei and Kaohsiung and the position of Taiwan governor. In 1996, the
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Republic of China had its first popular presidential election which signifies the ROC’s
transition into a democracy.
Since 2000, the ROC has experienced many other governmental and
constitutional reforms. In 2000 and in 2004 the government of Taiwan experienced a
series of constitutional reforms, the most import of which came during the Seventh
Revision in 2004. The seventh revision of the constitution included reducing the number
of legislative seats from 225 to 113, changing the term of the legislature from three to
four years, installing a single-district two-vote system in the legislative election, and the
abolishment of the National Assembly. The power to vote on constitutional amendments
was transferred from the National Assembly to the voters of Taiwan while the power to
impeach the president and Vice President was transferred to the grand justices.
In 2003 the Referendum Law was passed. It requires an extremely large number
of signatures to start an initiative, and in order to have the referendum pass requires that
half of the registered voters vote with majority in favor of passing the referendum. The
Referendum Law gave the power to the President to hold a referendum on national
defense issues where national security is being threatened. President Chen Shui-bian used
this law to his advantage as he held a referendum on national security during the 2004
Presidential election. Although the majority who voted on the referendum was in favor of
the issues, the referendum failed because it failed to have 50% of the eligible voting
population vote on the referendum.
Chen’s Years as President
Chen Shui-bian’s first years as president of the ROC met with great difficulty.
Although marked as the first president to be elected from a non- Kuomintang party, he
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won only be marginal percentages ahead of the opposition both in 2000 and again in
2004. When Chen first took office his cabinet lacked experience in high level government
positions so the transition was rough. Because of an economic slump and a devastating
earthquake that shook Taiwan in 1999 Chen was unable to fulfill his promises of better
social services. Chen also faced a series of impeachment attempts by opposition camp
and even within his own party. The most difficult time for Chen was when his son-in-
law was accused and latter convicted on insider trading, while his wife and presidential
aides were accused and indicted for money laundry. Despite all of the attempts to
impeach the president, all attempts have failed. As for the indictment of First Lady Wu
Shu-chen the case is still pending. Chen’s struggles as president is one example which
exemplifies strong political divide within Taiwan over national identity and relations with
China. Although Chen won by only a marginal percentage in his elections, it shows that
people in Taiwan are interested in ideas other than reunification.
Along with national identity, political corruption has become a key issue in
domestic politics and identity change. Just as things for the DPP were looking bleak for
the 2008 Presidential Election a new scandal has taken attention off of Chen and the DPP
and focused it back on the KMT; particularly the 2008 presidential hopeful Ma Ying-jeou.
Ma Ying-jeou, former Major of Taipei and former KMT Chairman declared this year that
he would run for the 2008 presidency. Ma announced his candidacy on the same night
that he was indicted for siphoning funds, also know in Taiwan as “black gold,” from his
mayoral allowance while he was Taipei mayor. It was estimated that he took over US
$330,000 during his years as mayor from 1998 to 2006.
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Ma Ying-jeou’s Political Scandal
Ma, who was popular with the people, was considered the leading candidate for
the 2008 election. During his earlier years of his political career as justice minister, Ma
cracked down on political corruption and vote buying. Ma was considered to be a clean
politician.
In the KMT Party Charter there is clause that is referred to as the Black-Gold
Exclusion Clause. It was added to the party charter in 2005 as an effort to crack down on
political corruption within the party. Any party member convicted by trial for crimes
stated in the charter become ineligible to be nominated by the party for elections. Ma’s
camp played a major role in the adoption of the clause’ However, on the very night of
Ma’s indictment the KMT Central Standing decided to repeal the clause. Although
officially the KMT claims that the repeal of the clause was not done specifically for Ma,
Ma’s indictment did create a matter of urgency. Currently Ma and the KMT are under
heavy scrutiny, Ma, for his scandal, and the KMT for their hasty action to repel the Black
Gold Exclusion Clause. These two affairs could cause the party and Ma to lose the 2008
Election; and equally detrimental, there are few successful candidates for the next, very
critical, Legislative Yuan election scheduled to be held in December 2007. Should such
an even occur, it is reasonable to deduce that identity in Taiwan will continue move in a
direction less focused on the mainland.
Identity Formation on Taiwan
Traditionally in Taiwan there was a great divide between the bensheng ren (native
Taiwanese) and the waisheng ren (mainlanders). The mainlanders were seen as an
oppressive regime not considerate of the local natives. While the waisheng ren lived in
62
Taiwan they intermarried and had children. The older generation of the Chinese that
came from China between 1945 and 1949 has been dying out; the younger generation has
replaced them in governmental position. Once it was believed that in order to be
considered Taiwanese one must be born in Taiwan and speak Minan, also know as
Taiwanese. Today that image of being Taiwanese has expanded. While people still
believe that one should be able to speak Taiwanese to consider themselves Taiwanese, it
has also become acceptable to consider one as Taiwanese as long as their nationality is
from Taiwan. Children of waisheng ren once considered as an outsider are now
welcomed within the Taiwanese community.
In 2003, much to China’s displeasure the Republic of China added the word
“Taiwan” to the face of its passport. Although this was seen by China as a move toward
independence Taiwan argues that the move was done to stop confusion at international
airports where Taiwanese citizens were often confused as mainland China citizens.
However, recently the government, specifically the Chen administration and the
Democratic Progressive Party, have been working to remove references within the
government and corporations in Taiwan that have the word “China” in their names.
Historical landmarks with references to Chiang Kai-shek have also been targeted.
Advocates of the anti-Chiang Kai-shek Campaign argue that Taiwan does not want to
honor a dictator who brought oppression on Taiwan.
Currently in Taiwan, maintenance of status quo is the most popular policy among
the people. However, there has been an increasing trend for support of pro-independence
versus pro-unification. This can also be seen as voters have continued to elect pro-
independence tilted candidates in elections. Since 1986, the Democratic Progressive Party
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has been gradually gaining support in every election. Between the two parties the DPP
and KMT, the DPP is more so seen as a party for the people of Taiwan, whereas, the
KMT has to prove that its loyalty is to the people and not to China. However, since both
parties do not have an overwhelming majority of support from the public, both parties
will have to fight for votes in the upcoming elections.
Final Remarks
The saga of the ROC on Taiwan is an ongoing struggle as it searches for identity.
China fights for reunification, and the United States pleas for stability in the Taiwan
Straits. The next determining phase in Taiwan’s path for the next four years rests upon
the Legislative Yuan Election in December 2007 and the Presidential Election in March
2008. National identity and political corruption will play key issues in these elections.
These elections will determine which party is in control of key governmental
organization and will, therefore, be the ones making official policy. If KMT is successful
then China can hope for reunification. If the DPP takes the lead then China’s wishes will
be indefinitely delayed. The Olympics will also be a significant variable since all eyes
will be on China in 2008. This will make it difficult for China to act harshly against
Taiwan or act in an unfavorable manner. In 2008, a new US President will be elected, and
the kind of policy the administration chooses to adopt will have an effect in the Straits.
With the political scandal surrounding Ma, it seems likely that the KMT will not
do as well in the Legislative and Presidential elections as previously expected. Of course
political scandals could emerge regarding Democratic Progressive Party members. The
current forecast 2007 and 2008 will be difficult years for the KMT. In regards to the
Legislative Yuan there will still be a large political divide between pan-blue and pan-
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green; green may gain a few more seats this year, well, that is in relation to the new
downsized 113 seats of the Legislative Yuan. Meanwhile, national identity will continue
to strengthen. This will, most likely, not be a sudden increase in “Taiwanese” identity but
a slow process like we have seen in prior years.
As to whether Taiwan will declare independence or reunify with China, no
certainty prevails at this point in time. However, should Taiwan ever reunify with China
it will not be within the near future. Regardless of whether Taiwan becomes independent
or reunifies with China both countries will have to learn to live as neighbors. As Yung-
ming Hsu notes possibility for reunification still exists. 
The people of Taiwan might have a sufficient incentive for unification with China once the
Mainland has achieved an acceptable level of democracy and a reasonably even distribution of
wealth.1
However, Hsu also adds that currently China is not in the political or social economic
condition to give Taiwanese incentive to seek reunification. China’s insistence on having
the right to invade Taiwan should Taiwan declare independence does not help China’s
cause either. It is the recommendation of this author for China to use soft power, as China
has done in the past few years, not hard power to persuade Taiwan. Anything other than
soft power will only fuel Taiwan’s desire for self-actualization and reinforce ideas of de
jure independence. Ultimately the people of Taiwan will have the final say in affirming
or disaffirming their own sovereignty. Much of this will be dependent on who is elected
to power, constitutional amendments and laws, how the Taiwanese people perceive
themselves and their relation to China. Identity formation on Taiwan will be critical in
determining the outcome.
1 Yung-ming Hsu, “U.S.-China-Taiwan Relations after the National Unification Council and the National
Unification Guidelines “Ceased to Function”,” Views & Policies 2, no. 4: 12.
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APPENDIX A
Anti-Secession Law
Adopted by National People’s Congress
China Daily, Mar. 14, 2005
The Anti-Secession Law, adopted at the Third Session of the Tenth National People’s
Congress of the People’s Republic of China on March 14, 2005, is hereby promulgated
and shall go into effect as of the date of promulgation.
Hu Jintao
President of the People’s Republic of China
March 14, 2005
The following is the full text of the Anti-Secession Law adopted at the Third Session of
the Tenth national People’s Congress on March 14, 2005:
Anti-Secession Law
(Adopted at the Third Session of the Tenth National People’s Congress on March 14,
2005)
Article 1
This Law is formulated, in accordance with the Constitution, for the purpose of opposing
and checking Taiwan’s secession from China by secessionists in the name of “Taiwan
independence” promoting peaceful national reunification, maintaining peace and stability
in the Taiwan Straits, preserving China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and
safeguarding the fundamental interests of the Chinese nation.
Article 2
There is only one China in the world. Both the mainland and Taiwan belong to one
China. China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity brook no division. Safeguarding
China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity is the common obligation of all Chinese
people, the Taiwan compatriots included.
Taiwan is part of China. The state shall never allow the Taiwan independence
secessionist forces to make Taiwan secede from China under any name or by any means.
Article 3
The Taiwan question is one that is left over from China civil war of the late 1940s.
Solving the Taiwan question and achieving national reunification is China’s international
affair, which subjects to no interference by any outside forces.
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Article 4
Accomplishing the great task of reunifying the motherland is the sacred duty of all
Chinese people, the Taiwan compatriots included.
Article 5
Upholding the principle of one China is the basis of peaceful reunification of the country.
To reunify the country through peaceful means best serves the fundamental interest of the
compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Straits. The state shall do its utmost with
maximum sincerity to achieve a peaceful reunification.
Article 6
The state shall take the following measures to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan
Straits and promote cross-Straits relations:
(1) to encourage and facilitate personnel exchanges across the Straits for greater mutual
understanding and mutual trust;
(2) to encourage and facilitate economic exchanges and cooperation, realize direct links
of trade, mail and air and shipping services, and bring about closer economic ties
between the two sides of the Straits to their mutual benefit;
(3) to encourage and facilitate cross-Straits exchanges in education, science, technology,
culture, health and sports, and work together to carry forward the proud Chinese
cultural traditions;
(4) to encourage and facilitate cross-Straits cooperation in combating crimes; and
(5) to encourage and facilitate other activities that are conducive to peace and stability in
the Taiwan Straits and stronger cross-Straits relations.
The state protects the rights and interests of the Taiwan compatriots in accordance with
law.
Article 7
The state stands for the achievement of peaceful reunification through consultations and
negotiations on an equal footing between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits. These
consultations and negotiations may be conducted in steps and phases and with flexible
and varied modalities.
The two sides of the Taiwan Straits may consult and negotiate on the following matters:
(1) officially ending the state of hostility between the two sides;
(2) mapping out
(3) steps and arrangements for peaceful national reunification;
(4) the political status of the Taiwan authorities;
(5) the Taiwan region room of international operation that is compatible with its status;
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(6) other matters concerning the achievement of peaceful natural reunification.
Article 8
In the event that the Taiwan independence secessionist forces should act under any name
or by any means to cause the fact of Taiwan secession from China, or that major
incidents entailing Taiwan secession from China should occur, or that possibilities for a
peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted, the state shall employ non-
peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China’s sovereignty and
territorial integrity.
The State Council and the Central Military commission shall decide on and execute the
non-peaceful means and other necessary measures as provided for in the preceding
paragraph and shall promptly report to the Standing Committee of the national People’s
Congress.
Article 9
In the event of employing and executing non-peaceful means and other necessary
measures as provided for it this Law, the state shall exert its utmost to protect the lives,
property and other legitimate rights and interests of Taiwan civilians and foreign
nationals in Taiwan, and to minimize losses. At the same time, the state shall protect the
rights and interests of the Taiwan compatriots in other parts of China in accordance with
law.
Article 10
This Law shall come into force on the day of its promulgation.
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APPENDIX B
KMT Party Charter
Chapter 12
Discipline, Awards and Punishment
Article 42
Party members who observe the Three Principles of the People and the Party Charter, adhere
to the party platform, obey party resolutions, enhance party interests, uphold party honor,
perform well in their duties, and contribute well, shall be awarded by the relevant body in
charge. Rules governing this shall be set out separately.
Article 43
Party members who commit any of the following acts shall be considered to have violated
party disciplinary rules and shall face disciplinary action:
1. Violate the Three Principles of the People, the Party Charter, policy platform or any
resolution passed by the Party.
2. Defame the Party’s reputation.
3. Form a clique within the Party, which leads to the disruption of party unity.
4. Slander the Party and in doing so harm the Party’s interests.
5. Become a member of another political party or parties.
6. Leak important confidential information.
7. Without the consent and authorization of the party’s Central Standing Committee,
accept an offer of a political appointment by a ruling party other than this Party.
Any party member who violates the Organized Crime Prevention Act, Hoodlum Prevention
Act, Narcotics Prevention Act, Guns, Ammunition and Knives Control Act, Money
Laundering Prevention Act, Corruption Punishment Act, Presidential and Vice Presidential
Election and Recall Act, or incites a riot, uses the threat of forces, or commits election bribery
under the Public Officials Election and Recall Act, commits election bribery under the
Farmers’ Association Act or Fishermen’s Association Act, commits a sexual crime cited
under Article 2 of the Sexual Violations Prevention Act, becomes involved n the sex trade of
children or juveniles under the Child and Juvenile Sex Trade Prevention Act, or commits
homicide, aggravated injury, robbery, misappropriation, fraud, perjury, blackmail, or
kidnapping for ransom under the Criminal Code, having been convicted by a court of justice,
whether final or not, shall forfeit the right to take part in the party primary, nor shall he/she be
nominated by the party; nor may he/she stand for elections for members of committees or
delegates to party assemblies at various party headquarters; These restrictions shall not apply
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to party members accused of any of the violations listed above but acquitted in a final ruling
prior to the holding of primaries or registration for elections.
Article 44
Party members who violate disciplinary rules shall be disciplined accordingly in the following
manner:
1. Receive a reprimand.
2. Have their party duties suspended.
3. Be suspended of their party rights and privileges
4. Have their membership revoked.
5. Be expelled from the party.
During primary elections for the party chairmanship, committeemen, National Congress and
assemblies of all levels, or primary elections for public office, any party member who
commits any of the following violations shall be disciplined accordingly in one of the ways
stated above. If the violation is serious, he/she shall be disqualified immediately from
participating in any election.
1. Using campaign activities, such as stumping or a signature drive, as a cover to incite a
riot which results in the disruption of election order.
2. Hindering the election process on purpose; using the threat of violence against
workers in the performance of official duties.
3. Pleading, making deals with, or giving bribes or other improper interests to candidates,
or persons who are qualified to be candidates to encourage them to give up their
election campaign or to engage in certain campaign activities.
4. Colluding with party members who have voting rights by pleading, making deals, or
giving bribes or other improper interests to encourage them not to exercise their voting
rights or to exercise their voting rights in a certain way.
5. Intending to influence the election result of a candidate by spreading rumors or
disseminating falsehoods detrimental to the public or others through the use of words,
graphics, recording, video images, speeches or any other methods.
6. Intending to hinder or disrupt voting or vote counting by withholding, destroying,
hiding, exchanging or taking away forcefully ballot boxes, ballots, voter registers,
voting report cards, tabulated vote counting tally reports, tabulated voting statistics, or
instruments used in marking ballots.
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Article 45
The words and deeds of elected officials of both the executive and legislative branches as well
as political appointees affiliated with this party should serve as a model for the rank and file of
the party. The rules regarding the assessment of the aforementioned shall be stipulated by the
competent organizations.
Article 46
When party members violate party discipline, the party headquarters to which the party
member belongs, or the higher party body shall conduct an inquiry and decide on disciplinary
action in a manner prescribed as follows:
1. Disciplinary action requiring a reprimand shall be carried out after a resolution has
been passed by the committee of the party headquarters concerned, or of the higher
party body.
2. Disciplinary action requiring suspension of party duties, or party rights and privileges
shall first be decided on by the organization in charge and then forwarded to the
Central Discipline Committee for review and execution.
3. Disciplinary action requiring revoking of party membership shall be executed after a
resolution has been passed by the Central Evaluation Committee.
4. Disciplinary action requiring the expulsion of the party member shall be first decided
after a resolution has been passed by the Central Discipline Committee, and then
approved by the Central Standing Committee for execution.
Party members who receive disciplinary action may appeal to a higher party headquarters.
Rules regarding the reporting, reviewing, appeal and execution of a disciplinary case, and the
procedures regarding the reinstatement of party membership, party rights and party duties
shall be set out separately.
Article 47
Party headquarters at all level shall set out discipline committees. They shall be responsible
for the study and formulation, control, and evaluation of the work of the Party; the
supervision, censure and review of disciplinary cases; and the inspection and auditing of Party
finances. Members of discipline committees shall be appointed by higher-level party
headquarters.
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APPENDIX C
Key Vocabulary
Major Political Parties in Taiwan
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) (民主進步黨)
Chinese Nationalist Party or Kuomintang (KMT) (中國國民黨)
People’s First Party (PFP) (親民黨)
Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) (台灣團結聯盟)
Key Party Members in KMT
Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) Former Party Chairman
Lien Chan (連戰) Former Party Chairman
Wang Jin-pyng (王金平) President of the Legislative Yuan
Wu Po-hsiung acting chairman after Ma
Key Party Member in DPP
Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) President
Premier Su Tseng-chang ( 蘇貞昌 )
DPP Chairman Yu Shyi-kun (游錫堃)
Frank Hsieh (謝長廷) former premier
Annette Lu (呂秀蓮), Vice President
Important Political Figures
Shih Ming-the (施明德) Former DDP Chairman, causes Chen trouble
Chao Chien-ming ( 趙建銘 ) son-in-law of President Chen Shui-bian
Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石)
James Soong (宋楚瑜)
Lee Tung-hui ( 李登輝 ) First popularly elected president and first native Taiwanese
president
Key Terms
Black Gold (黑金) ,
KMT black-gold exclusion clause(排黑條款)
Taiwan High Court's Black Gold Investigation Center
Central Election Commission (CEC) (中央選舉委員會組織
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